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I. INTRODUCTION
Instability is the hardy perennial of financial markets.' Charles
Kindleberger, the eminent financial historian, remarked that financial
intermediation has always been an essential but fragile business.2
Unlike other businesses, however, the failure of a financial
institution is a serious event that may trigger systemic consequences
for the whole economy, well beyond the fate of the individual bank
and its customers.' Economists refer to this as "systemic risk,"4 a
1. See Factsheet: How the IMF Promotes Global Economic Stability, INT'L
MONETARY FUND (Mar. 27, 2015), https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/glob
stab.htm (arguing that financial stability relies on avoiding financial crises and
"swings in economic activity, high inflation, and excessive volatility in exchange
rates and financial markets"); see also ROSA M. LASTRA, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STABILITY 92 (2006) [hereinafter LASTRA, LEGAL
FOUNDATIONS] (defining financial stability as the safety and soundness of the
financial system and the stability of the international payment and settlement
systems); GARRY J. SCHINASI, SAFEGUARDING FINANCIAL STABILITY: THEORY
AND PRACTICE 82 (2006) (describing financial stability as a situation in which the
financial system simultaneously performs three key functions, including the
general allocation of resources, the assessment and management of prospective
risks, and the maintenance of stability sufficient to withstand economic surprises
and shocks); TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA, REGULATING FINANCE: BALANCING
FREEDOM AND RISK 110 (2004) ("[Financial stability is] a condition in which the
financial system is able to withstand shocks, without giving way to cumulative
processes, that impair the allocation of savings to investment opportunities and the
processing of payment in the economy."); Garry J. Schinasi, Defining Financial
Stability 8 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/04/187, 2004) (defining a
financial system in a range of stability as one that facilitates the performance of an
economy and that disposes of financial imbalances that arise from within and from
unforeseen events).
2. Cf CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS,
AND CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 16 (5th ed. 2005) (highlighting
concepts developed by the scholar Hyman Minsky who argued that the financial
system is "unstable, fragile, and prone to crisis"); see also id. at 35 (presenting a
model of economic boom and bust focused on episodic manias and the resulting
crises).
3. Viral V. Acharya & Tanju Yorulmazer, Information Contagion and Inter-
Bank Correlation in a Theory of Systemic Risk 2-3 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research,
Discussion Paper No. 3743, 2003) (explaining the risks of information contagion,
where the failure of a bank's loans incurs losses leading to failed promises of
returns to depositors, which in turn conveys a negative outlook in regard to the
state of the economy to other banks that adjust their actions accordingly, yet fail as
well).
4. See id. at 2 (claiming that an understanding of systemic risk is integral to
handling financial crises and underlies the need for bank regulation).
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problem that has always existed in financial systems.' However, it is
undeniable that the complexity of modem financial markets,6 the
pivotal role of finance in modem economies, and the unprecedented
level of integration between markets and institutions at all levels of
economic development,7 make systemic risk a particularly pernicious
problem for regulators.8 Financial regulators worldwide have thus
devoted particular attention to reducing systemic risk by enacting
appropriate legislation and by setting up new institutional
mechanisms, such as the Financial Stability Oversight Council9 in
the United States and the European Systemic Risk Board 10 in the
European Union ("E.U."). Behind the intuitive simplicity of the
concept, the precise nature of systemic risk and its evolution has
5. FELIX MARTIN, MONEY: THE UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 82-83 (2013)
(reporting that even during the reign of Roman Emperor Tiberius in A.D. 33, a
boom in private lending led Tiberius to impose one of the first known financial
regulations, though Julius Caesar limited private lending by wealthy aristocrats
decades prior to Tiberius' reign).
6. See generally Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation, and the Regulation of
Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 235, 245 (2012) (noting that
modem financial markets are compounded in their complexity by the nature and
pace of innovation and highlighting six different drivers of complexity as well as
the interplay between complexity and financial innovation).
7. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
TRANSITION CHALLENGES TO STABILITY xi (2013) (remarking that stability
challenges are now common in emerging markets, while noting that advanced
economies are impacted by foreign investors who crowd local markets); see also
RANJIT TEJA ET AL., INT'L MONETARY FUND, 2012 SPILLOVER REPORT 1 (2012)
(summarizing the modem global market as involving high correlation, pervasive
financial disruptions, and a heightened sensitivity to the actions of systemic
economies).
8. See Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States
Financial System, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 671, 672-73 (2010) [hereinafter
Scott, Reduction of Systemic Risk] (identifying systemic risk reduction as the
central problem facing financial regulators).
9. See EDWARD V. MURPHY & MICHAEL B. BERNIER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42083, FINANCIAL STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL: A FRAMEWORK TO
MITIGATE SYSTEMIC RISK 4 (2011) (reporting to Congress on the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, which was created by the Dodd-Frank Act to monitor
systemic risk and coordinate with regulators).
10. See FINANCIAL REGULATION AND SUPERVISION: A POST-CRISIS ANALYSIS
v-vi (Eddy Wymeersch et al. eds., 2012) (detailing how a 2008 E.U. report on the
recent financial crisis led to the implementation of "repairs" aimed at strengthening
all areas of financial business regulation as well as the establishment of the
European Systemic Risk Board).
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always been highly controversial.1" At the outset of the 2008
financial crisis, most Group of Twenty ("G-20") countries did not
even have a formal definition of systemic risk to guide their
regulatory intervention. 2
After the financial crisis, systemic risk reduction was at the top of
the international regulatory agenda. 3 This is unsurprising given the
high level of financial integration of the last twenty years.14 The
International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision ("BCBS"), and the Financial Stability Board
("FSB") now monitor financial stability and are developing a
coherent international financial regulatory framework. 5
11. See Acharya & Yorulmazer, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that although
systemic risk is central to the existence of many bank regulations, the causes and
effects are not entirely understood; highlighting recent contagion models amongst
banks promulgated by other authors, but distinguishing those models as
characterized by contagion and financial fragility arising from inter-bank liabilities
as opposed to the authors' own models based on measures of risk arising from
bank liabilities due to the borrowing costs of surviving banks following other bank
failures).
12. See INT'L MONETARY FUND ET AL., GUIDANCE TO ASSESS THE SYSTEMIC
IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, MARKETS, AND INSTRUMENTS: INITIAL
CONSIDERATIONS-BACKGROUND PAPER 10 (2009) (reporting that when
surveying member countries, no legal or formal guidance existed for how the
members defined "systemic importance," with nuanced responses differing on the
focus of the ultimate impact).
13. See generally Daron Acemoglu et al., Systemic Risk and Stability in
Financial Networks, 105 AM. ECON. REv. 564, 564 (2015) (noting that following
the 2008 financial crisis, the international community has accepted that the
architecture of the international financial system plays a key role in the systemic
risks associated with the system); id. (stating that since the 2008 financial crisis,
the systemic risk model has risen to the status of conventional wisdom as new
regulatory frameworks have been developed, although it is still not fully
understood).
14. See generally STRATEGY, POLICY, AND REVIEW DEP'T, INT'L MONETARY
FUND, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS 11 (2010) [hereinafter
IMF, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS] (describing the
interconnectedness of a global system which includes, among other hallmarks,
common lenders and borrowers, increasingly global strategies that have been come
particularly interlinked since the mid-1990s, and linkages between banks and
nonbanks).
15. There is a vast literature on the international financial architecture. See
EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE LAW,
THE ECONOMICS, THE POLITICS 7 (2012) [hereinafter AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE]
(noting that because domestic regulatory systems cannot effectively deal with
cross-border contagion and other global issues, organizations such as the IMF, the
20151 669
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Despite a large effort in this direction, confusion remains about the
precise forms and patterns of global systemic risk.16 The concept of
systemic risk has long been developed mostly within economic
theory.17 Economists have developed various theoretical frameworks
European Union, the G-20 countries, the Basel Committee, and other transnational
networks have produced standards and regulations to secure the operation of
international banks and global financial markets); CHRIS BRUMMER, SOFT LAW
AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 68-69
(2012) [hereinafter BRUMMER, SOFT LAW] (providing an overview of the global
regulatory architecture and discussing the actors involved).
16. See Acemoglu et al., supra note 13, at 585-86 (remarking that theories on
the relationship between systemic risk and financial network structure tend to
reach antipodal conclusions and positing a model of diversified network structure
dependent on a critical number of system shocks).
17. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, FINANCIAL STABILITY REvIEw 134-35
(2009) (explaining the concept of systemic risk through differing theories and
discussing the development of systemic risk theories over the decades);
HANDBOOK ON SYSTEMIC RISK xx-xxi (Jean P. Fouque & Joseph A. Langsam eds.,
2013) (noting the difficulty of defining systemic risk in order to address it, despite
the vast amount of scholarship devoted to the topic); INT'L MONETARY FUND,
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MEETING NEW CHALLENGES TO
STABILITY AND BUILDING A SAFER SYSTEM 63 (2010) (explaining how the recent
financial crisis has caused the overlying concept of systemic risk to be
redeveloped); see also Acemoglu et al., supra note 13, at 567, 569 (highlighting a
vast field of related literature and presenting an economic model for analysis of
systemic risk); Viral V. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of
Prudential Bank Regulation, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 224 (2009) (examining systemic
risk, systemic risk-shifting, and the impacts of regulations); Douglas W. Diamond
& Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 91 J. POL.
ECON. 401 (1983) (examining the role of bank runs in financial crises, including
bank runs as a symptom and as a risk of damage); Xavier Freixas et al., Systemic
Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank, 32 J.
MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 611 (2000) [hereinafter Freixas et al., Systemic Risk]
(modeling systemic risk while analyzing the ability of an interconnected system to
withstand the effects of insolvency in a single bank); Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean
Tirole, Interbank Lending and Systemic Risk, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING
733, 733-34 (1996) (analyzing systemic risk as a byproduct of a decentralized
banking system and analyzing "too big to fail" policies); Acharya & Yorulmazer,
supra note 3 (modeling two aspects of systemic risk, the ex post aspect, where a
bank failure results in the collapse of a surviving bank, and an ex ante aspect, in
which banks hold portfolios that increase the possibility of joint failure); Franklin
Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion 1-2 (C.V. Starr Center for Applied
Econ., Research Report No. 98-33, 1998) (exploring models of contagion and
interregional financial structures); Eugenio Cerutti et al., Systemic Risks in Global
Banking: What Available Data Can Tell Us and What More Data are Needed? 3
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/1 1/222, 2011) (highlighting
challenges to systemic risk management and areas where additional data is
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and models to explain the different patterns of international financial
contagion and how they propagate in an interconnected global
financial network. 8 In doing so, economists have largely focused on
market failures-such as contagion, information failures, or common
shocks-as the main underlying causes of systemic risk.19
This article analyzes one particular aspect within the broader
theory of global systemic risk: the role of domestic policies. The
need to analyze domestic policies arises because, while financial
markets are global, the scope of regulatory intervention within the
global financial system is still largely national.20 We propose that
within such a system, states' diverging policy preferences or
government failures contribute to financial instability.
Based on this conclusion, the article then analyzes the role of
international law in coordinating domestic policies and addressing
global systemic risk. While regulation is necessary to address market
inefficiencies in a closed national economy, regulatory coordination
is difficult to achieve-and sometimes even undesirable-in an open
global economy in which states hold diverging policy preferences.2'
needed).
18. The literature on global financial instability is vast. See ROGER W.
FERGUSON JR. ET AL., INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL STABILITY 5-6 (2007)
(providing an analytical framework for assessing international financial stability);
see also GLOBALIZATION AND SYSTEMIC RISK v (Douglas D. Evanoff et al. eds.,
2009) (suggesting that increased globalization may either increase or decrease risk
to national markets); INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTABILITY: GLOBAL BANKING
AND NATIONAL REGULATIONS (Douglas D. Evanoff et al. eds., 2007) (discussing
the globalization of banking but not of banking regulations); THE INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS: HOW THE RULES OF FINANCE CHANGED? (Asli Demirguc-Kunt
et al. eds., 2011) (providing a collection of articles on the 2008 financial crisis, its
causes, and how to move forward).
19. Among the most important are the Triffin dilemma (when short-term
domestic interests conflict with long-term international interests), the Mundell-
Fleming monetary trilemma (arguing that an economy cannot simultaneously have
a fixed exchange rate, free capital movement, and an independent monetary
policy), and Dirk Schoenmaker's financial trilemma (arguing that financial
stability, financial integration, and national financial policies are incompatible).
20. See FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 137 (noting that international
regulators have failed to reach agreement on future oversight, with hedge fund
regulation as one example of a global community prone to various national
regulations).
21. See infra Part VI.
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Irrespective of its national or global form, systemic risk is a
function of two interdependent variables.2 The control exerted by
public authorities on each variable directly influences the efficiency
of a financial system and the amount of instability it might transmit. 3
The first variable is the trigger event-the underlying cause of
instability.24 Economic and legal theories have often analogized
trigger events to various types of market inefficiencies. 5 The
analysis, however, focuses on domestic policies as a trigger event. In
particular, it examines regulatory and policy asymmetries and
government failures, including the factors at their origin and the role
22. Cf FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 18, at xxii (laying out an analytical
framework of triggering events and transmission mechanisms, though splitting the
triggering events into exogenous shocks and endogenous imbalances).
23. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk:
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1351, 1351-52
(2011) (arguing that specific regulatory measures designed with the proper
framework such as enhancing the resilience of asset markets during times of crisis
can enhance stability and disrupt transmission of systemic risk); see also
FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 17 (drawing attention to the issue of hedge
funds, which enjoy high diversity through relatively little regulation while having a
heightened potential for transmitting instability). But cf FERGUSON ET AL., supra
note 18, at 119 (stating that although regulators should continue promoting
oversight and transparency, "hedge funds enhance market stability and are unlikely
to be the source of systemic failure").
24. See, e.g., FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 18, at xxii (pointing to exogenous
shocks and endogenous imbalances as the underlying triggers of instability).
25. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power and
Limits of Law, 2012 Wis. L. REv. 815, 816-17 (2012) [hereinafter Schwarcz,
Controlling Financial Chaos] (analyzing triggers behind recent financial crises,
including the collapse of Lehman Brothers, and suggesting regulations to address
triggers before they arise); Manuel A. Utset, Complex Financial Institutions and
Systemic Risk, 45 GA. L. REv. 779, 816 (2011) (examining the role of systemic risk
and complex institutions in the 2007-2009 financial collapse and examining
various triggers such as the proliferation of repos); John Crawford, CDO Ratings
and Systemic Instability: Causes and Cure, 7 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 1 (2010)
(providing an analysis of events triggering the 2008 financial crisis); Scott,
Reduction of Systemic Risk, supra note 8, at 673-76 (identifying four different
systemic linkages-interbank deposits, net settlement payment systems, imitative
runs, and counterparty risks on derivative transactions-which are susceptible to
triggering chain-reactions); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193,
196-97 (2008) [hereinafter Schwarcz, Systemic Risk] (noting definitional
differences in trigger events depending on how one defines systemic risk, with the
common denominator being a chain of bad economic outcomes).
672 [30:4
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of international law in addressing them.26 The second variable is the
transmission mechanism-the financial interconnectedness through
which financial instability propagates. 27 Here, the role of the law is to
balance the benefits of an extended network with the threat that a
negative event might spread across the network.
This article is divided into six sections. Section II briefly
introduces the mainstream theories of systemic risk and explains
their limits in addressing global financial instability.28 It also
analyzes the peculiarities of global systemic risk in terms of
transmission mechanisms and the diverging structures within the
international financial system. Section III analyzes the evolution of
the global financial system from a unit-based system to a network-
based system and the role of global financial interconnectedness.2 9 It
explains why interconnectedness arises and argues that, although
interconnected network structures increase efficiencies in the global
financial system, if the network is not properly constructed, it can act
as a transmission-namely contagion-mechanism.30 Section IV
addresses trigger events and proposes that global systemic risk is
caused by two different mechanisms: (i) policy or regulatory
asymmetries and (ii) government failures.3 Section V explains the
role of the law in reducing global systemic risk.32 After introducing
the financial trilemma as the overarching theory for the regulation of
global systemic risk, Section VI analyzes the tradeoffs faced by
regulators in addressing interconnectedness and trigger events.
Finally, this article concludes that while international law plays a
crucial role in addressing global systemic risk, it cannot address all
sources of global instability.33 On one hand, international law levels
the global playing field for financial regulation by mobilizing
domestic political interests favoring regulatory convergence. 34
26. See infra Parts IV-V.
27. See generally Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 1351-53 (positing
that independent correlations can combine to transmit local shock systemically and
applying the analysis to four historical financial crises).
28. See infra Part 11.
29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Part IV.
32. See infra Part V.
33. See infra Part VI.
34. Janet L. Yellen, Vice Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
20151 673
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Similarly, international law can harmonize global regulation of
financial interconnectedness, thereby preventing inefficient unilateral
measures. On the other hand, reducing global contagion requires
international cooperation that can be very difficult and sometimes
unadvisable.
II. SYSTEMIC RISK THEORY AND ITS LIMITS
The study of financial crises has developed as an almost
autonomous discipline in economics and finance. In this burgeoning
literature, which now also informs law and political science,
systemic risk occupies center stage." However, the study of global
Remarks at the American Economic Association/American Finance Association
Joint Luncheon 16 (Jan. 4, 2013) (stating that in April 2012, when international
regulators promulgated newly strengthened standards for market entities,
American regulators, including the Federal Reserve, participated and proposed for
incorporation of the new standards into domestic regulations).
35. See Julie A.D. Manasfi, Systemic Risk and Dodd-Frank's Volcker Rule, 4
WM. & MARY Bus. L. REV. 181 (2013) (examining systemic risk and legislative
policy consideration); Yellen, supra note 34, at 5 n.6 ("A search for either
'interconnectedness' or 'systemic risk' in article abstracts of academic research
cataloged by EconLit results in 311 entries from 1988 to 2006. The same search
conducted for the period from 2007 through the present yields 624 entries."); Julia
Lees Allen, Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and
Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2012) (examining the effect
of derivatives clearinghouses on systemic risk); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political
Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and
Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1056-57 (2012) (including
discussion of systemic risk in political analysis of post-crisis reforms); John
Crawford, Predicting Failure, 7 VA. L. & Bus. REV. 171, 172 (2012) (proposing
broadened criteria for identifying systemically important financial institutions,
institutions whose failure to survive pose a systemic risk); Kathryn Judge,
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic
Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 662 (2012) (providing the case study of securitized
home loans' role in the 2007-2009 financial crisis as an example of how
complexity and innovation can increase systemic risk); John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Systemic Risk After Dodd-Frank: Contingent Capital and the Need for Regulatory
Strategies Beyond Oversight, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 802 (2011) (examining
political realities in light of the 2008 financial crisis, the resulting Dodd-Frank Act,
and the problems of systemic risk); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller,
Confronting Financial Crisis: Dodd-Frank's Dangers and the Case for a Systemic
Emergency Insurance Fund, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 151, 153, 204 (2011) (utilizing
theories on systemic risk to advocate for a firm financed insurance fund that would
mutualize risk and obviate politically unpopular bailouts); Bernard S. Sharfman,
Using the Law to Reduce Systemic Risk, 36 J. CORP. L. 607, 608 (2011) (arguing
that the law and regulators have a significant role to play in addressing systemic
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systemic risk has been relegated to the periphery. Most literature
discusses systemic risk as the result of market inefficiencies, which
spread contagion across an interconnected financial network.36 This
does not take into account the vital roles of states and their
jurisdictional differences in triggering systemic risk. This section
introduces the most important theories of systemic risk and
demonstrates their limits when applied to the global financial system.
A. SYSTEMIC RISK AS THE RESULT OF MARKET FAILURES
Systemic risk theory has evolved over time, in line with
technological advancements and the constantly changing underlying
structure of financial markets.37 In 1873, Walter Bagehot advocated
for the role of a lender of last resort?8 The late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries saw the creation of modem central banks and
depositor guarantee schemes.39 These are examples of financial
risk reduction); Edward F. Greene et al., A Closer Look at 'Too Big to Fail':
National and International Approaches to Addressing the Risks of Large,
Interconnected Financial Institutions, 5 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 117, 119 (2010)
(examining the impact of institutions considered "too big to fail" on systemic risk);
Jeffrey B. Golden, The Courts, the Financial Crisis and Systemic Risk, 4 CAPITAL
MARKETS L.J. 141, 143 (2009) (arguing that although much recent literature has
been devoted to studying systemic risk, it has failed to consider how uninformed
courts making decisions with financial impact might themselves create systemic
risk); Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 25, at 196-97 (highlighting
inconsistencies in defining systemic risk and suggesting a definition in light of
disintermediation, as well as positing a role for the law in addressing systemic
risk); cf Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 513-14 (2011)
(arguing for the political legitimacy of bailouts as an ex post answer to systemic
risk). But see Matthew Beville, Comment, Financial Pollution: Systemic Risk and
Market Stability, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 245, 246 (2009) (noting that systemic risk
has received significant attention from economic commentators but little attention
from legal scholars).
36. See, e.g., FERGUSON ET AL., supra note 18, at 5-6 (discussing contagion
and aggregate shocks as two mutually reinforcing forms of systemic risk).
37. See Judge, supra note 35, at 684-86 (discussing the evolution of
securitizations, the development of fragmentation nodes, and the impact of
innovation on systemic risk).
38. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY
MARKET 298 (3d ed. 1873) (explaining that central banks must act as a lender for
those in the most dangerous of financial situations because no other entity will do
so).
39. By modem central banks, we mean central banks that have the monopoly
on money creation, control the payment system, control the liquidity of the
financial system, and provide emergency liquidity assistance to banks in distress.
20151 675
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authorities struggling to limit systemic risk.4° Despite the simplicity
of the concept, economists and regulators disagree over the precise
causes of instability and its transmission mechanisms. Modem
systemic risk theory can be traced back to three fundamental types of
market failures: information failures, contagion, and common
shocks.41
1. Information Failures
Prior to the development of the modem financial system as an
interconnected network, panics were the main cause of financial
instability.42 Panics arise when investors cannot adequately process
and evaluate market information,43 causing misinformation and
Although some central banks-like the Bank of England or the Swedish
Riksbank-were established in the seventeenth century, they started to perform the
abovementioned functions much later. See generally RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL.,
FINANCIAL STABILITY AND CENTRAL BANKS: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 20-35
(2001) (providing a historical background of the evolution of central banks as well
as examining the roles central banks play in promoting stability); CHARLES
GOODHART, THE EVOLUTION OF CENTRAL BANKS 5-11 (1988) (discussing the role
of central banks analyzing the interrelationship of macro and micro functions of
central banks).
40. GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE
DON'T SEE THEM COMING 25-28 (2012) [hereinafter GORTON,
MISUNDERSTANDING] (discussing the history of Federal Deposit Insurance, a form
of a depositor guarantee scheme, which provided effective regulation and ushered
in the "Quiet Period," a temporary end to systemic crisis).
41. In a free market economy, markets are considered self-correcting, as they
do not need government intervention to function efficiently. In economic theory,
market failures generally indicate the negative consequences that sometimes arise
from the inability of markets to correct themselves. Examples of market failures
include time-inconsistencies, monopolies, externalities, public goods, principal-
agent problems, adverse-selection, non-competitive markets, or informational
asymmetries. In economic theory, market failures are used as a justification for
regulatory intervention. See Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72
Q. J. ECON. 351, 351 (1958) (defining market failure as an inability of a market to
self-sustain "desirable" activities or prevent "undesirable" activities). Market
failures occur in all aspects of economic life, from finance to public policy. See
GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 40, at 29; John 0. Ledyard, Market
Failure, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 300, 300-03 (Steven
N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008) (providing detailed definitions of
market failure terms with bibliographic citations).
42. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 2, at 16-17 (applying a model
developed by Hyman Minsky to analyze historical crises that culminated in panic
and crash up through the 1990s).
43. See Acharya & Yorulmazer, supra note 3, at 3 (arguing that during a crisis,
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irrationality." The most basic forms of panic were bank runs45 and
fire sales. 46 Nowadays, bank runs are less frequent, although they
recently occurred during the bankruptcy of Northern Rock Bank in
the United Kingdom,47 in Greece during the 2008 financial crisis, and
in Cyprus in 2013.
International bank runs might occur when the news of a cross-
border bank failure in one country causes panic in one of its foreign
subsidiaries or branches.48 It might also occur when one country
experiences an economic downturn, triggering panic in another
country with a similar economy. This occurred during the Argentine
financial crisis, when bank depositors in Uruguay demanded the
withdrawal of their money due to fears that the government in
Uruguay would fail to maintain its peg to the dollar, as the Argentine
peso failed to do.49
Investor panics are often a relevant factor in international financial
crises. For example, in the years preceding the 1997 East Asian
crisis, Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the
Philippines financed much of their economic growth through inflows
banks exhibit a herding behavior, which increases the cost of borrowing for the rest
of the financial system; further arguing an increased risk aversion by financial
institutions following the collapse of Lehman Brothers caused the breakdown of
the money market in 2008).
44. See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 2, at 41-42 (drawing
distinctions in manifestations irrationality, hysteria, and mob psychology).
45. In a self-fulfilling prophecy, depositors rush to the bank to withdraw their
deposits fearing that their bank will be insolvent, thereby forcing the closure of the
bank. See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 40, at 32 (reporting that since
1970, approximately sixty-two percent of financial crises around the world
involved some variation of a bank run).
46. Where investors rushed to sell their assets, causing a sudden depreciation
in their value.
47. See Rosa M. Lastra, Northern Rock, UK Bank Insolvency and Cross-
Border Bank Insolvency, 9 J. BANKING REG. 165, 166 (2008) (stating that the
announcement of emergency liquidity assistance in coordination with a poorly
designed and publicized deposit insurance program ignited a bank run on Northern
Rock branches from September 14 to September 17, 2007).
48. Cf Mehdi Mili & Jean-Michel Sahut, Bank Liquidity Shocks in Loan and
Deposit in Emerging Markets 4 (IPAG Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 2014-210,
2014) (discussing how expansion of credit by foreign banks risks transmitting
credit shocks to the host country).
49. Thomas Moser, What Is International Financial Contagion?, 6 INT'L FIN.
157, 165 (2003) (detailing the Argentine financial crisis).
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of foreign capital." This created an asset bubble, where an asset's
price is over-inflated and not supported by the demand for the asset."
When investors began to doubt the stability of these economies, they
also began to panic, triggering a massive reversal of capital
outflows.5 2 The capital outflows caused currencies in Thailand, South
Korea, Malaysia, and Indonesia to rapidly depreciate, escalating the
financial crisis into a full-blown currency disaster. 3
2. Contagion
Prior to the global financial crisis of 2008, the concept of systemic
risk was synonymous with financial contagion: a cascade of defaults
starting with one financial institution that spreads to others by virtue
of their interconnectedness5 4 The most common example is
contagion that spreads through the market due to the credit
interconnectedness between the financial institutions."
50. See Ross Buckley, An Oft-Ignored Perspective on the Asian Economic
Crisis: The Role of Creditors and Investors, 15 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 431, 431
(2000) (detailing the East Asian financial crisis).
51. Id. at433.
52. Id.
53. There are various debates on the true reasons behind the crisis. However,
there is a consensus that the underlying roots of the crisis lie in the premature
opening of the financial sector, which was not supported by an adequate regulatory
framework and which fuelled massive capital inflows; by diffuse corrupt practices
in local banks, often plagued by crony capitalism, which exacerbated the macro-
financial stability-instability loop; and weak monetary policies in which the local
currency was informally pegged to the U.S. dollar, which eventually created
massive current account deficits when the U.S. dollar strengthened in 1995. See id.
at 439-41; see also AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE, supra note 15, at 73; DOUGLAS
ARNER, FINANCIAL STABILITY, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE ROLE OF LAW 27-29
(2007).
54. See R. Kollmann & F. Malherbe, Financial Contagion, in HANDBOOK OF
SAFEGUARDING GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, CULTURAL,
AND ECONOMIC THEORIES AND MODELS 139 (Gerard Caprio Jr. ed., 2013) (noting
simultaneous global collapse following a shock originating in the United States);
Allen & Gale, supra note 17, at 34 (noting that while interregional crossholdings
of deposits work during times of sufficient liquidity in the banking system, when a
financial crisis emerges in one region, contagion may spread the crisis to other
regions as a result of the crossholdings).
55. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 17, at 733-34 (explaining that the
interbank market consists as a financial network in which banks and other financial
institutions, such as hedge funds or insurance companies, are connected through
mutual interbank deposits and loans, and that banks with excessive liquidity
usually provide loans on a short-term basis to banks with a shortage of liquidity,
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The logic underlying contagion is that the more a financial
network is interconnected, the more its financial institutions are
exposed to risk. In such a network, a single negative event is likely to
trigger a widespread chain reaction capable of impacting even those
institutions that are only marginally involved in the network.5 6 The
destructive effects are magnified when a failing institution is "too big
to fail."" This creates a morally hazardous problem for the
institution, which may opt for the best solution for itself, ignoring the
consequences of its actions on the greater financial system. In that
case, the government would intervene by bailing out the systemically
important institution.
One of the most effective regulatory tools to address contagion is
the adoption of capital buffers for each financial institution
participating in the market. Because banks tend to be highly
leveraged having borrowed more than they own, they are highly
exposed to the risk. Even a minimal loss, such as a nonperforming
interbank loan, might trigger the bank's insolvency. 8 High capital
buffers can minimize the impact of external shocks on individual
banks by decreasing such leverage.59 The Basel Accords,60 which set
a cohesive regulatory framework for capital adequacy regulation, are
perhaps the most important feature among the vast array of financial
regulation.61 However, the recent crisis exposed the limits of the
often even without the backing of collaterals).
56. See Moser, supra note 49, at 159, 162 (defining contagion and identifying
the transmission mechanisms of contagion).
57. See Greene et al., supra note 35, at 119 (noting that globally
interconnected "too big to fail" companies can have significant effects on national
and global economies because of their complexity); Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr.,
Reforming Financial Regulation to Address the Too-Big-To-Fail Problem, 35
BROOK J. INT'L L. 707, 748-49 (2010) (remarking that despite their access to
government subsidies, large financial conglomerates produce higher levels of
systemic risk, are subject to greater risks from their activities, and operate on a
dangerous business model).
58. See ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS' NEW CLOTHES:
WHAT'S WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 17 (2013)
(explaining how borrowing creates leverage, which allows for individuals and
business to create opportunities, but the leverage magnifies risks).
59. See id. at 23 (illustrating the importance of buffers through a home loan
example where equity can absorb losses on a home).
60. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (2004).
61. See Viral V. Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act and Basel III: Intentions,
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Basel Accords.62 By assuming that the stability of individual
financial institutions automatically guarantees the stability of the
global financial system, the Basel Accords completely ignore the
broader interplay between the institutions and the global market. This
interplay can lead to common shocks.63
3. Common Shocks
The financial crisis of 2008 demonstrated that systemic risk occurs
not only through interbank relationships, but also through common
shocks.64 Consequently, the regulatory focus shifted from governing
the risk of individual institutional breakdowns to the risk of
breakdowns within the entire system.
To appreciate how common shocks develop, understanding how
modem finance is structured is necessary. Banks and other financial
institutions operate in financial markets not only by lending money,
but also by owning and trading assets.66 The use of derivatives for
hedging and position-taking purposes, and the broader process of
securitization, now represents the core businesses of banks. 67 The
Unintended Consequences, Transition Risks, and Lessons for India 9-10 (Asian
Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 392, 2012) [hereinafter Acharya, The Dodd-
Frank Act] (giving a history of the creation and purpose of the Basel Accords as
promulgated by the Basel Committee, which, although lacking statutory authority,
has become the lead group for creating standards for banking supervision).
62. See id. at 10 (observing that systemic risk is surprisingly not a focus of
Basel III, despite being promulgated after the recent crisis, and is disappointing for
not identifying when a solvency risk or liquidity risk is likely to lead to a systemic
risk).
63. See id. at 13 (deeming the Basel standards a flawed macroprudential tool
because of their focus on individual risk rather than systemic risk).
64. See id. at 3 (stating common shocks are the "well-understood" backdrop
for the Dodd-Frank Act because they hit the long-term assets of the financial
sector, causing mass disruption and failure).
65. Rosa M. Lastra, Systemic Risk, SIFIs, and Financial Stability, 6 CAPITAL
MARKETS L.J. 192, 199 (2011) [hereinafter Lastra, Systemic Risk] (stating that after
the recent crisis, when the "too big to fail" designation was extended from banks to
securities, insurance, and investment institutions, the focus on systemic risk
required regulators to look at breakdowns within systems and not just individual
institutions).
66. See Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 61, at 28 (noting that the
financial sector was engaged in trading massive amounts of mortgage backed
securities, which the Basel capital requirements failed to appreciate were at risk to
a common shock).
67. See Ross CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 72 (2d ed. 2002)
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market-to-market accounting method used by the Basel Accords to
value the price of the assets on a bank's balance sheet sets the value
of the assets to its actual market value.6" When the market value of
those assets declines, the bank suffers a net loss on its balance sheet
that can lead to the perilous situation of insolvency.6 9
Common shocks proved to be a destructive force in the 2008
financial crisis when the collapse in the market of collateralized debt
obligations led to a freeze in the repo market and from there the
system.70 Common shocks can also occur on an international scale.'
When banks invest in the same class of assets, a rapid decline in
asset value not only reduces the bank's capital base but also affects
its interbank exposures.72 A similar situation can also arise with
liquidity constraints. 73 Investors affected by a crisis in one country
(noting that banks and bank regulators view the benefits of derivatives trading as
so high that regulation has largely been avoided); Judge, supra note 35, at 659
(discussing securitization as a profitable innovation which is likely to yield even
more gains in the years ahead).
68. See Awrey, supra note 6, at 253-54 n.85 (noting that mark-to-market
accounting is also known as "fair value" accounting, which seeks to base value on
market price, market price of similar assets, or other "fair" values).
69. See id. at 254 n.86 (describing the spiral pattern that can result from
linking balance sheets to market values).
70. See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 40, at 132 (describing the
repo system and referring to it as a "shadow banking system"); GARY GORTON,
SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 29-37 (2010) (explaining
the history of repo transactions as well as the panic run on them during the
financial crisis); Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking
System, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 261, 263-64
(discussing the differences between "on balance banking" and "shadow banking").
71. See Acharya, The Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 61, at 4 (describing how the
recent global financial crisis began with a common shock that cascaded to the
failure of international financial institutions).
72. Karl Whelan, for instance, developed a basic model in which three banks,
located in three different countries, invest in the same asset. When the market
sentiment on the profitability of those assets declines, Bank A makes a loss in its
loan books that reduces its capital base and forces it to sell some of its securities in
a fire sale. This in turn reduces the value of the securities sold and of the remaining
securities in the balance sheet, thereby further reducing the value of the bank
assets. Bank B and Bank C, which also invested heavily in the same securities,
now suffer a similar loss due to the depreciation in the value of the assets. In order
to recoup the value of their balance sheet they decide not to roll over the loans to
Bank A, which is now on the verge of default. See Karl Whelan, Containing
Systemic Risk 5-6 (Univ. Coll. Dublin Ctr. for Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
WP09/27, 2009).
73. Moser, supra note 49, at 167 ("[L]iquidity or capital constraints could
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might "unwind their positions" in other markets to meet collateral
demands or margin calls.74 This occurred early in the 1998 Russian
crisis when international investors took short positions in the
relatively deep market for Brazilian debt to hedge long positions in
Russian securities.5 More recently, the U.S. subprime mortgage
crisis of 2007 seriously affected some European banks that heavily
invested in those products prior to the crisis.76 In fact, the losses of
Swiss bank UBS were so high that the Swiss government had to
intervene with a $59 billion bailout to stabilize UBS. 77
B. GLOBAL SYSTEMIC RISK BEYOND MARKET FAILURES
The literature above presents many of the problems regulators face
in addressing systemic risk in a domestic financial system. However,
it is inadequate in the global finance context. In a domestic system,
the only factor responsible for creating and transmitting systemic risk
is the behavior of private agents. Government action does not
directly contribute to creating systemic risk; rather, such instability is
the product of market inefficiencies.78 In contrast, in a global
financial system, the state plays a fundamental role in creating and
impose greater than optimal asset reduction on international investors affected by a




76. IMF, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, supra note 14,
at 26-27 (highlighting a liquidity squeeze that prompted European institutions to
convert euros to dollars, prompting a global dollar shortage).
77. Warren Giles, UBS Gets $59.2 Billion Bailout,; Credit Suisse Raises
Capital, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid =
newsarchive&sid=ahOAFa2SEHhw (explaining the details of the UBS bailout).
78. This does not mean that government action or inaction does not affect
systemic risk indirectly. Indeed, state intervention might increase the proclivity of
markets to invest in certain asset classes, directly influence certain macroeconomic
variables, or simply fail to address dangerous market inefficiencies. See Deborah
Lucas, Evaluating the Government as a Source of Systemic Risk, J. FIN. PERSP.
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 11), available at http://cfp.scripts.mit.edu/
home/wpcontent/uploads/2014/09/SystemicRiskFinal.pdf (remarking that the type
of risk a government can cause is different from the risks caused by private-sector
financial institutions because the government creates the rules, is motivated by
political considerations, and is generally slow to react or make changes). But see
id. at 12-17 (arguing the U.S. government is a source of systemic risk because of




transmitting instability.7 9 Global systemic risk thus requires a
different analysis.
1. Systemically Important Jurisdictions
The global financial system has two layers. While the operation of
firms and markets is the layer most often considered by mainstream
literature, the more fundamental layer concerns the interaction
between firms and governments.80  The control exerted by
governments within their territory not only determines the rules by
which firms operate but also influences important macroeconomic
variables that directly influence the behavior of foreign firms.81
The role of states is augmented by the fact that most global trading
takes place in a few core nodes: systemically important national
financial systems that dominate trading in particular asset classes.8 2
In its financial surveillance mandate,83 the IMF developed the
concept of "Jurisdictions with Systemically Important Financial
79. IMF, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, supra note 14,
at 9-11 (identifying eight global common lenders (France, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States)
through which the majority of global finance and shock transmission flow).
80. See infra Part II.B.2.
81. Kollmann & Malherbe, supra note 54, at 139-43 (identifying the exchange
rate, the level of external indebtedness, and the level of liquidity as examples of
such variables).
82. See IMF, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, supra note
14, at 9 (noting that the majority of global lending comes from the eight global
common lenders, in various sectors including advanced economies, developing
economies, and offshore centers); see also DIMITRI G. DEMEKAS ET AL., INT'L
MONETARY FUND, MANDATORY FINANCIAL STABILITY ASSESSMENTS UNDER THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: UPDATE 16 (2013) (utilizing a new
methodology to identify a total of twenty-nine countries at the core of the global
system); STRATEGY, POLICY, AND REVIEW DEP'T, INT'L MONETARY FUND,
MAPPING CROSS-BORDER FINANCIAL LINKAGES: A SUPPORTING CASE FOR
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS 11 (2011) [hereinafter IMF, MAPPING CROSS-
BORDER FINANCIAL LINKAGES] (stating that of the relatively few "core nodes" that
dominate the global financial system across various asset classes, even fewer are
emerging markets).
83. See DEMEKAS ET AL., supra note 82, at 16 (explaining that the IMF's
surveillance mandate did not require stability assessments prior to September
2010).
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Sectors" to highlight the systemic risk potential posed by instability
in one of these nodes.84
The architecture of the global financial system around core nodes
has two serious implications. First, global systemic risk is so highly
concentrated that the failure of a core node would trigger disastrous
global consequences.85 Second, any changes to regulation or
macroeconomic conditions in a systemically important jurisdiction
would have an increased impact on the global market.8 6 Accordingly,
states representing core nodes in a particular asset class are
positioned to monopolize global regulatory and macroeconomic
power and also must assume the associated negative consequences.87
2. Sovereignty Problems
The second difference between domestic and global financial
systems concerns the role of the state as a creator of systemic risk. In
a global economy where markets and financial institutions operate
across jurisdictions, the nation state plays a vital economic role in
maintaining financial stability and, crucially, creating financial
instability.88
84. See id. at 15 (including jurisdictions that comprise the core of any one of
four networks (bank, debt, price correlations, and equity networks) as being a
jurisdiction with systemically important financial sectors).
85. See id. at 16 (noting that the large number of European countries acting as
central nodes justifies the surveillance mandate due to their interconnected systems
with one another and with other financial centers).
86. See IMF, MAPPING CROSS-BORDER FINANCIAL LINKAGES, supra note 82,
at 39 (describing a "concentration risk" where shocks are transmitted more
strongly than in a highly interconnected situation where the links are uniform).
87. See Beth A. Simmons, The International Politics of Harmonization: The
Case of Capital Market Regulation, 55 INT'L ORG. 589, 595 (2001) (discussing
hegemonic regulator theory in the context of the United States, for whom it is more
costly to change its own policies versus changing those of other countries, and thus
regulatory changes are motivated by internal regulatory needs and politics); see
also Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization, Harmonization, and Competition: The
Different Pathways to Policy Convergence, 12 J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 841, 849 (2005)
(concluding that there is a lack of incentive to coordinate regulatory standards in
the absence of a hegemon where the benefit is low and the cost high).
88. See THE WORLD BANK, GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2013:
RETHINKING THE ROLE OF THE STATE IN FINANCE 81-83 (2012) (exploring the




While financial markets are global, financial regulation is largely
national.89 Therefore, global financial institutions are subjected to
differing regulatory risks that would not be present if they were only
operating at the domestic level. For example, a government might
implement dangerous macroeconomic policies that leads to a default
or a financial crisis, which can then spread to the wider global
financial system.90 Alternatively, a state might implement legitimate,
welfare-enhancing economic policies that nevertheless have negative
cross-border spillovers to partner countries.91 A state might also
refuse to enforce regulatory standards abroad to promote its own
domestic policy interests or refuse to cooperate with foreign
regulators. 92 Thus, regulatory and government risk is difficult to
control because foreign players have little influence over a host
country's domestic policies.93
III. GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS
Until the 2008 financial crisis, few thought about whether the very
structure of the financial system contributes to global financial
instability. 94 The speed and force of global contagion at the outset of
89. See Charles Goodhart & Rosa M. Lastra, Border Problems, 13 J. INT'L.
ECON. L. 705, 714-17 (2010) (analyzing "the second boundary problem," where
cross-border banking continues to be constrained by national laws); see also
Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34
YALE J. INT'L L. 113, 114 (2009) [hereinafter Verdier, Transnational Regulatory
Networks] (noting that although regulation in many critical areas is left to
individual states, the national regulators have formed informal transnational
regulatory networks such as the Basel Committee and the International
Competition Network in the absence of international treaties).
90. See Lorenzo B. Smaghi, Sovereign Risk, in STABILITY OF THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM: ILLUSION OR FEASIBLE CONCEPT? 237 (Andreas Dombret & Otto Lucius
eds., 2013) (explaining that sovereign risk is the odds that a country will default on
its loans and the international implication that it can have).
91. Cf Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 89, at 715-16 (stating that when states
discuss regulations calling for "a level playing field," cross-border backlash often
results from nations with less restrictive regulations).
92. See infra Part IV.
93. Of course, they might be able to repatriate their assets, but this strategy
applies only to portfolio investors, such as hedge funds, which have short-term
positions. When we look at global systemic risk, sometimes the instability is
produced by the exposure to long-term sovereign debt, currency, or foreign assets
contracts, or by the presence of the financial institution in a foreign country.
94. See Yellen, supra note 34 (noting the dearth of literature during the
eighteen-year period preceding the financial crisis as compared to the six years
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the global and European sovereign debt crises suggest that the tight
configuration of the modem financial systems plays a significant role
in spreading global systemic risk.95 One of the core problems of
financial instability, both domestically and globally, is the presence
of a network-like structure in which financial institutions, markets,
and governments are linked with each other through bilateral
financial agreements and transactions.96 While an individual financial
firm's participation in such a network enhances the firm's economic
efficiency and growth, it nonetheless exposes the firm, and
indirectly, its host country, to the externalities that may arise from
the individual or collective behaviors of agents.97
Thus, international law must determine whether to structure the
global financial system as a network or as a unitary system where the
level of interdependence is lower. Both options entail fundamental
tradeoffs in terms of economic efficiency, profitability, and crucially
stability.9"
A. FINANCIAL SYSTEMS FROM UNITARY TO NETWORK SYSTEMS
Modem finance works through a complex network of firms that
share a common characteristic: they are very highly interconnected
with each other.99 This high level of interdependence is not an
after 2007).
95. See IMF, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, supra note
14, at 4 (remarking that the speed with which losses in markets can translate onto
the global stage is associated with the highly interconnected system).
96. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 1354-55 (stating that the high
degree of interconnectivity between financial institutions creates a network for
which the transmission of risk is dispersed among the members).
97. See id. (observing that networks not only absorb shocks, the effects of
which are then dispersed amongst members, but also amplify shocks).
98. See CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS & STEPHEN H. HABER, FRAGILE BY DESIGN:
THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF BANKING CRISES AND SCARCE CREDIT 183-84 (2014)
(explaining unit-banking systems prevent diversifying risk with banks); Anabtawi
& Schwarcz, supra note 23, at 1354-55 (detailing the network model of financial
systems, where risk is spread throughout a system to absorb shocks, though this
can lead to massive "systemic collapse").
99. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
RESPONDING TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND MEASURING SYSTEMIC RISKS 73
(2009) (articulating that while economic growth is spurred by the interconnected
nature of the financial system, the links between global financial systems has
increased the likelihood that market disruptions can spread quickly across borders);
Steven L. Schwarcz, Intermediary Risk in a Global Economy, 50 DUKE L.J. 1541,
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intrinsic characteristic of finance but the result of constant attempts
by firms and governments to rely on each other to increase efficiency
and maximize returns.00
Financial systems were originally structured as unit-based
systems. 01 In national systems, financial intermediaries were
historically independent from their national competitors and
conducted business within limited territorial boundaries. 02 Until the
mid-nineteenth century, no common currency or payment system
existed. 03 Each bank had to issue its own banknotes, which were
1545 (2001) (discussing that if an intermediary financial institute fails, such a
failure can create chain reactions within other organizations that have resources
invested in the intermediary, which can in turn threaten the global financial
system); Kartik Anand et al., A Network Model of Financial System Resilience 2
(Econ. Risk Berlin, Discussion Paper No. 2011-051, 2011) (explaining the modem
financial system consists of a web of financial institutions, which include, but are
not limited to, households, firms, insurance companies, and hedge funds); Rodney
J. Garratt et al., Mapping Systemic Risk in the International Banking Network 3
(Bank of England, Working Paper No. 413, 2011) (arguing that downgrades in
U.S. subprime mortgages and the interconnectedness of the modem financial
system led to the global financial crisis in 2008). See generally Sabine Dammasch,
The System of Bretton Woods: A Lesson From History (2001) (unpublished essay,
Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg), available at http://www.ww.uni-
magdeburg.de/fwwdeka/student/arbeiten/OO6.pdf (indicating that Harry Dexter
White and John Maynard Keynes played a large role in developing the modem
finance system by creating the proposal for the negotiations at Bretton Woods).
100. See Garratt et al., supra note 99, at 5 (acknowledging that banks have
become linked internationally through "direct claims on each other, ownership
structures .... other risk transfers .... [and] participation in common markets").
101. See CALOMIRIS & HABER, supra note 98, at 183-84 (discussing the flaws
of unit-based systems, including a "lack of diversification of risk," "pyramiding of
the banking system's reserves," and the "difficulty of coordinating responses of
banks to liquidity crises").
102. For a variety of reasons, mostly linked to the political economy of the
eighteenth-century United States, each confederated state granted banking charters
only to a handful of local financial institutions, which were allowed to operate only
within the territorial limits of the federated state. To preserve the political rents
granted to local elites by such an oligopolistic model, until the mid-nineteenth
century, the U.S. federal and state courts consistently denied non-locally chartered
financial institutions-mostly wealthy banks in New York or Baltimore-the right
to establish a branch in another state, thus preventing the creation of a national
financial system. The political foundations of unit banking were thus the result of a
political alliance between local populist politicians and powerful farmers in Which
banks were serving mostly the interests of local elites. See id. at 180-83
(explaining the history, structure, and ultimate decline of the unit-banking system).
103. See National Bank Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1938) (establishing
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, which oversees the "issue and
2015]
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
discounted differently from bank to bank, imposing a massive
currency risk on traders.104
The creation of the global financial system followed a largely
similar pattern. During World War II, forty-four Allied nations met
in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, to discuss how to improve the
structure of the international financial and monetary system,
ultimately designing the Bretton Woods monetary system.10 5 John
Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White, the architects of the
Bretton Woods System, agreed that capital mobility should be left
out of the perimeter of cooperation, "not merely as a feature of the
transition, but as a permanent arrangement [of the international
monetary system] .106
Thus, for more than thirty years, the international financial system
operated as a constellation of individual national systems,
independent from each other in terms of regulatory structure,
macroeconomic dynamics, and market interconnectedness.107 The
Bretton Woods System was predicated on exchange rate stability and
enshrined in law by article IV of the Articles of Agreement of the
regulation of a national currency secured by U.S. bonds"); GORTON,
MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 40, at 11-18 (detailing the transition from the
U.S. Free Banking Era of 1837-1863 to the passage of the National Bank Acts of
1863-1864, which enabled the federal government to produce money and replace
private banknotes with national bank notes using a tax-incentive system); see also
MARTIN, supra note 5, at 13 (explaining the commodity payment system, in which
goods were accepted as payment rather than paper money).
104. For instance, the same banknote issued by a bank in New York for $10,
might have been worth only $8.20 in Baltimore, depending on the level of trust
that banks had toward each other. See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note
40, at 11.
105. BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF THE
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 91-134 (2008) [hereinafter EICHENGREEN,
GLOBALIZING CAPITAL] (providing a detailed account of the meeting).
106. RAWI ABDELAL, CAPITAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL
FINANCE 7 (2007) (quoting John Maynard Keynes, Address to the House of Lords
(May 23, 1944)).
107. See EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL, supra note 105, at 189-90
(detailing the state of the international financial system after the collapse of the
Bretton Woods System); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The International Monetary
System: A Look Back Over Seven Decades, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 575, 576 (2010)
(explaining that before the introduction of the IMF each nation imposed its own




IMF ("IMF Articles"). 108 However, a significant drawback of this
approach was that, while states retained the freedom to control
domestic macroeconomic policy, they enjoyed only limited
international capital mobility.109
The unit-based financial system had two main features relevant to
this article. First, systemic financial crises were less common than
they are now. Crises did occur, and often, but primarily because of
the inability of banks to spread the risk across the system, thereby
increasing the possibility that a small shock could cause a bank to
become insolvent. 110 At the global level, given the limited
international capital mobility,"' crises were often the result of
domestic problems, such as balance of payment or market
inefficiencies, which were usually resolved through exchange rate
devaluations or intervention by the IMF. 2
Second, financial sector fragmentation caused an inefficient and
limited distribution of credit.'13 For example, in the United States, in
the absence of a network, banks had to rely on independent funding
structures where a handful of wealthy local shareholders who
controlled the banks collected capital. At the global level, without an
integrated network, banks did not have the opportunity to raise
capital while costs were lowest and sell it when it provided the
108. On the original formulation of article IV of the IMF Articles, see Joseph
Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77
AM. J. INT'L L. 443, 445-47 (1983) (citing the IMF Articles as the central
governing agent of the Fund, because they govern the financial resources, scope,
and operation of the fund); Harold van B. Cleveland, Reflections on International
Monetary Order, 11 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 403, 403 (1972) (expanding on the
core principles of the Bretton Woods System: freedom to manage international
investment and trade and steady exchange rates).
109. See EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL, supra note 105, at 91-134
(comparing the state of the global economy before and after the collapse of the
Bretton Woods System).
110. See CALOMIRIS & HABER, supra note 98, at 183-84 (explaining unit-
banking systems prevent diversifying risk within banks).
111. It is worth noting that international capital mobility survived even during
the Bretton-Woods era, mainly in the form of sovereign debt financing.
112. See EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL, supra note 105, at 120-25
(discussing currency devaluation and IMF intervention in the context of the 1961
German and Dutch revaluations).
113. See CALOMIRIS & HABER, supra note 98, at 182-83 (commenting on the
limitations of credit with unit-banking, where banks had to lend to local elites or
risk not lending to anyone).
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highest return."14 As a result, this increased the cost of and reduced
the availability of international credit.
Over time, the need to supply credit to the economy surpassed the
diffidence towards banking conglomerates. In the late twentieth and
early twenty-first centuries, national financial systems made the
availability of credit a foremost policy objective." 5 Banks were
permitted to operate according to the logic of economic efficiency. 116
They began to rely on each other to enhance credit supply, achieve
economies of scale, and reduce business risk." 7 They did so by
creating common infrastructures to support their businesses, offering
financial services to each other, and creating new financial
products." 8 This process drastically increased the interconnectedness
between firms and markets and ultimately resulted in the financial
network structure that we know today. "19
In the 1970s, the iron curtain of capital controls that governed the
international financial system began to be dismantled. 20 The rise of
Eurodollar deposits and the Eurocurrency markets offering foreign
currency dominated financial services and deprived monetary and
114. See id. at 183-84 (noting, with the advent of unit banking, bankers often
had to lend to lower-risk lenders or risk not being able to lend to anyone).
115. This is the system that led finance to become "a special sector" in the
economy and a major driver of economic growth in some jurisdictions. See id. at
180-81, 203-55 (explaining that the increased availability of credit for all sectors,
from individuals to corporations was the result of precise political directives).
116. See id. at 202 (discussing increases in economic efficiency following the
fall of the unit-banking system by pointing out the new system allowed "new
access to credit for entrepreneurs, boosted investment and income, and improved
competition in banking" which resulted in reductions in unemployment and
income inequality).
117. See id. at 240.
118. In 1863, the U.S. federal government put an end to the free banking era by
eliminating local bank currencies and by issuing paper money that traded at par
and was backed by the government. In 1913, the Federal Reserve was created to
oversee the monetary policy and the stability of the financial system, and in 1933,
the U.S. Department of Treasury created the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation to provide a basic safety net to depositors in the event of a crisis.
Although the original distrust by American authorities toward big conglomerate
banks remained until the 1980s, thus leading to the creation of the shadow banking
system, the level of interconnectedness between financial institutions increased
exponentially. See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 40, at 11-18.
119. Id. at 10-11 (examining the evolution of the modem financial system).
120. Lowenfeld, supra note 107, at 575 (discussing the decline of the fixed
exchange rates linked to gold).
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financial authorities of the power to control parts of their own
financial systems.121 When article IV of the IMF Articles was revised
in 1977 to allow exchange rate flexibility, the Bretton Woods System
officially collapsed. 22 The ability to adopt a flexible exchange rate
regime removed the constraints on capital mobility. This permitted
nation states to open their financial systems to the services of foreign
firms and to access a much wider pool of capital.
Furthermore, as the global financial market opened, regulatory
barriers blocking the movement of capital were progressively
dismantled. 23 By the 1990s, the deregulatory process led to the
creation of the shadow banking system and more sophisticated
financial instruments. 24
B. THREE LEVELS OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS
The process of financial liberalization not only increased credit
supply and extended the scope of financial markets, it also created
121. See JOHN EATWELL & LANCE TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCE AT RISK: THE
CASE FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION 36-39 (2000) (detailing the increased
presence of the Eurodollar in the markets as a way for commercial banks to utilize
"excess reserves" and discussing the undermining of regulation of commercial
banks' off-shore lending practices); EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL, supra
note 105, at 134-83 (commenting on the "lessons" learned from the fallout of the
Bretton Woods System); BARRY EICHENGREEN, GLOBAL IMBALANCES AND THE
LESSONS OF BRETTON WOODS 7 (2007) (comparing the British Pound Sterling and
the European Euro as reserve currency); Cleveland, supra note 108, at 413
(analyzing the market trend in the 1960s to increase the "international mobility of
liquid funds" due to the advent of multi-national firms and the expansion of
"Eurocurrency markets").
122. On the changes in article IV of the IMF Articles, see Lowenfeld, supra
note 107, at 578 and Gold, supra note 108, at 445.
123. See ABDELAL, supra note 106, at 32 (explaining loosening restrictions on
capital flows increases states' access to foreign private capital and leads to
economic growth); AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE, supra note 15, at 64-88; JEFFREY
M. CHWIEROTH, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMF AND THE RISE OF FINANCIAL
LIBERALIZATION 4 (2010) (discussing capital account liberalization across various
markets, including the European Union, South Korea, Chile, Singapore, and
China); EICHENGREEN, GLOBALIZING CAPITAL, supra note 105, at 134-85
(analyzing the rise of capital mobility in the years following the collapse of the
Bretton Woods System).
124. AVGOULEAS, GOVERNANCE, supra note 15, 64-88; see Gorton & Metrick,
supra note 70, at 261 (commenting on the development of the shadow banking
system, which evolved after the financial crisis of 2007 and performs the "same
functions as traditional banking" while reducing regulatory oversight).
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new layers of interdependence between different national
economies. 12 Like national financial systems, the global financial
system quickly evolved as a network structure. 12 6 However, the types
of exposures and linkages between economies and the dynamics that
pushed toward financial integration in the global system were
fundamentally different than those in a closed national economy.
This global financial interconnectedness can be divided into three
main types: (i) market-to-market, (ii) market-to-sovereigns, and (iii)
common infrastructures. 127
1. Market-to-Market Interconnectedness
When governments removed regulatory barriers and liberalized
the cross-border movement of capital, 128 firms began to exploit the
increased scope of the market by establishing foreign operations
offering services on a cross-border basis or simply by investing in
foreign assets. 129 While there is no conclusive evidence on the impact
of financial globalization on economic growth, mainstream economic
theory has provided the economic benefits of financial integration
since the 1970s. 130 By reducing barriers to the movement of capital,
125. See Federico Lupo-Pasini, The International Regulatory Regime on
Capital Flows 3 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 338, 2011), available
at http://www.adbi.org/files/2011.12.30.wp338.intl.regulatory.capital.flows.trade.
services.pdf [hereinafter Lupo-Pasini, International Regulatory Regime]
(explaining capital mobility increases as regulations decrease).
126. See Acemoglu et al., supra note 13, at 1 (commenting on the tendency of
financial markets to "spread risk throughout the system" and the impact this
philosophy has on regulations).
127. See IMF, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, supra note
14 at 4, 7 (describing the interconnectedness of the financial system as comprised
of institutions, markets, instruments, and infrastructure).
128. On the regulatory framework for capital mobility, see Federico Lupo-
Pasini, Movement of Capital and Trade in Services: Distinguishing Myth from
Reality Regarding the GATS and the Liberalization of the Capital Account, 15 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 581, 581-619 (2012) and Lupo-Pasini, International Regulatory
Regime, supra note 125, at 3.
129. See Council for Trade in Services, Background Note by the Secretariat:
Financial Services, S/C/W/72, at 5 (Dec. 2, 1998) (detailing cross border financial
services statistics in regards to imports and exports from the European Union,
United States, and Canada); see also Stijn Claessens, Regulatory Reform and
Trade Liberalization in Financial Services, in DOMESTIC REGULATION AND
SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 129, 129-31 (Aaditya Mattoo & Pierre Sauve
eds., 2003).
130. See MASAMICHI KONO ET AL., WORLD TRADE ORG., OPENING MARKETS IN
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firms have been able to expand their activities across borders to
achieve economies of scale, collect capital where it is cheaper, and
invest it where it is more profitable."' Consumers have similarly
enjoyed the benefits of increased competition, such as higher
diversification of products, reduced cost of credit, and more
financing opportunities.132
One type of global interconnectedness is through interbank
claims. 133 According to the Bank for International Settlements and
IMF studies, cross-border banking claims increased sharply between
the 1990s and the 2008 financial crisis, reaching more than half of
global gross domestic product ("GDP"). 3 4 The process was reversed
at the outset of the crisis, and current cross-border banking claims
now represent around thirty-five percent of global GDP. 135 Up until
the global crisis, low interest rates caused banks to rely less on
standard sources of financing and more on money market mutual
funds, short term commercial papers, and repos. 3 6 Another source of
interconnectedness is the derivative market-which, in December
FINANCIAL SERVICES AND THE ROLE OF THE GATS 10 (1997) (citing a study
finding that in an attempt to capitalize on potential growth, during the 1990s, fifty
percent of developing countries integrated their financial systems, which was
remarkably higher than the 1980s).
131. Id. at 17.
132. For the economics of financial services liberalization, see id. and WENDY
DOBSON & PIERRE JACQUET, FINANCIAL SERVICES LIBERALISATION IN THE WTO 1, 3
(1998).
133. See Rosa Maria Lastra, Cross-Border Bank Insolvency: Legal Implications
in the Case of Banks Operating in Different Jurisdictions in Latin America, 5 J.
INT'L BANKING REG. 201, 202-03 (2004) [hereinafter Lastra, Cross-Border Bank
Insolvency] (explaining cross-border banking insolvency laws should seek to
create "fair and predictable treatment of creditors and maximization [sic] of assets
of the debtor in the interests of creditors," due to the nation-based structure of
banking regulations).
134. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
MOVING FROM LIQUIDITY- TO GROWTH-DRIVEN MARKETS 107 (2014) [hereinafter
IMF, MOVING FROM LIQUIDITY] (commenting on the increases in cross-border
banking claims "since the mid-1990s" which occurred due to "deregulation of
banking activities, capital account liberalization, and financial innovation").
135. See id. (explaining the sharp increase in cross-border banking claims prior
to 2007 due to liberalization and deregulation and the reversal of the trend as a
result of the financial crisis of 2008 due to deleveraging and restructuring).
136. See GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 40, at 25-28; IMF,
UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, supra note 14, at 21-28
(noting that the preferred sources of financing prior to the crisis carried less
regulatory burdens).
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2013, reached an aggregate value of $710 trillion' 37-- upon which
systemically important financial institutions ("SIFIs") rely heavily to
hedge against risk.138
The most prominent source of interconnectedness in the global
financial system is represented by global systemically important
financial institutions ("G-SIFIs"). 13 9 These are multinational financial
institutions operating across different countries through a centralized
structure relying on a network of foreign affiliates. 14 According to
the FSB, there were thirty G-SIFIs in the world as of November
2014, half of which are headquartered in Europe. 141 The rise of G-
SIFIs is a result of the combination of financial liberalization and
market dynamics. 142 Financial institutions have various incentives to
increase in size and expand across borders. By opening branches or
subsidiaries abroad, they can access a wider consumer base, while at
the same time relying on an already established and tested
organizational structure.14 1 In addition, by relying on an integrated
137. Derivatives Statistics, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org/
statistics/derstats.htm (last updated Apr. 30, 2015).
138. IMF, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS, supra note 14,
at 28.
139. In their policy reports, the Financial Stability Board and the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision use also the term Global-Systemically
Important Banks. The two terms can be used interchangeably.
140. The FSB first developed the concept of SIFIs, of which G-SIFIs represent
an evolution on a global scale to identify those financial institutions "whose
disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic
interconnectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider financial
system and economic activity." FIN. STABILITY BD., REDUCING THE MORAL
HAZARD POSED BY SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: FSB
RECOMMENDATIONS AND TIME LINES 1 (2010) [hereinafter FSB, REDUCING
MORAL HAZARD]; see Eugenio Cerutti et al., How Banks Go Abroad. Branches or
Subsidiaries?, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 1669, 1669-70 (2007) (discussing the
importance of foreign bank operational structures in host countries).
141. 2014 Update of List of Global Systematically Important Banks, FIN.
STABILITY BD. (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/wp-
content/uploads/r_141106b.pdf; see also DIRK SCHOENMAKER, GOVERNANCE OF
INTERNATIONAL BANKING: THE FINANCIAL TRILEMMA 10-11 (2013) [hereinafter
SCHOENMAKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING] (discussing the role of SIFIs in the
2008 financial crisis because of the "too-big-to-fail doctrine").
142. SCHOENMAKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 141, at xvii, 1-2
(explaining G-SIFIs have evolved as a result of increases in "branches and
subsidiaries abroad," which banks establish by acquiring local banks).
143. See IMF, MOVING FROM LIQUIDITY, supra note 134, at 110 (discussing the
benefits of G-SIFIs by arguing such institutions can spur growth in local
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network between the parent bank and its affiliates, they can collect
credit while it is cheaper and offer it when it is more profitable. 14
They can also spread and diversify risk across an extended network
and capture economies of scale by offering new services and new
products. 145 Finally, and importantly, the increase in size represents
an increase in the implicit subsidy granted by too-big-to-fail
protection. 146
G-SIFIs have two fundamental characteristics that make them
particularly prone to transmitting instability across borders. The first
is their peculiar structure, which acts as a bridge between different
national financial systems. 147  Since G-SIFIs operate with an
integrated structure, they can move capital relatively easily from one
local operation to the other, distribute and channel funds across the
system, and operate as the main intermediaries between core nodes
and markets. The second characteristic is the breadth of their
business operations, which typically span all sectors of financial
activity, encompassing trades and investments in virtually every
financial product.148 As pointed out by the FSB, given G-SIFIs'
complex structure and size, "their distress or failure would cause
significant dislocation in the global financial system and adverse
economic consequences across a range of countries." '149
economies).
144. Id.
145. See Jonathan Fiechter et al., Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit
All? 8 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Note No. SDN/11/04, 2011)
(commenting on the benefits of operating as a branch structure versus a subsidiary
structure, because subsidiaries must have "higher capital and liquidity buffers" to
accommodate the higher risk).
146. See CALOMIRIS & HABER, supra note 98, at 215-16 (laying out the
perceived benefits of the megabank operating under the too-big-to-fail doctrine).
On the problem of SIFIs, see Lastra, Cross-Border Bank Insolvency, supra note
133, at 204 (mentioning that bailout packages raise issues of risk behavior and fair
competition within the banking industry as a whole).
147. FSB, REDUCING MORAL HAZARD, supra note 140, at 1 (charting the
connections between G-SIFIs and other entities, including governments, banks,
and individuals).
148. According to the IMF, "[G-SIFIs] dominate the markets for debt, equity
securities, syndicated loans, securitization, structured financial products, and OTC
derivatives. They are the main counterparties for large insurers and some of the
biggest broker dealers." IMF, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS,
supra note 14, at 7 (discussing the diversified and interconnected portfolios and
structures of these "systemic players").
149. FSB, REDUCING MORAL HAZARD, supra note 140, at 2.
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2. Market-to-Sovereigns Interconnectedness
Sovereign debt also contributes to global interconnectedness.
States have often resorted to financial markets to finance their
expenditures15 ° and, in spite of the power imbalance between the two,
banks have usually found sovereign lending a profitable business.15'
Occasionally, however, the inability or unwillingness of sovereigns
to service their debts has led to the insolvency of financial
institutions. This occurs primarily because when lending to a
sovereign, banks become directly exposed to foreign debt risk. 152 The
debt that the Organization on Economic and Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") issued to sovereigns is used by the lending
bank as collateral for its financing operations; therefore, the
declining value of sovereign bonds makes it difficult for banks to
carry out their daily financing operations. 53
150. Bankers and sovereigns have a long history of cooperation that dates back
centuries. The constant financing needs of sovereigns to wage wars spurred the
emergence of the banking business in Florence in the fifteenth to sixteenth
centuries. See CHARLES TILLY, COERCION, CAPITAL, AND EUROPEAN STATES AD
990-1990 85-86 (1990).
151. NIAL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
WORLD 167-68 (2009).
152. Caruana and Avdjiev add three further factors. First, since the higher risk
of sovereign bonds is reflected in the rating system, the downgrade of bonds
automatically downgrades the rating of all companies in the state. Indeed,
according to rating rules, the rating of a company cannot be higher than that of the
sovereign where the company is listed. Second, the increased risk of sovereign
debt risk make sovereign and private debt close substitutes in investor portfolios,
thereby increasing the competition between the two forms of debt. Thus, without
the easy availability of sovereign debt, banks will have more difficulties financing
in the market. Finally, a loss of market confidence in sovereign debt may trigger
fiscal consolidation. See Jaime Caruana & Stefan Avdjiev, Sovereign
Creditworthiness and Financial Stability: An International Perspective, 16 FIN.
STABILITY REv. 71, 74 (2012).
153. Id. ("There is evidence that in 2010 30% of the spread at launch on bank
bonds reflected the conditions of the sovereign, and this figure was as high as 50%
for countries for which sovereign strains were most pronounced.").
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Sovereign risk is inherent to sovereign financing. 154 However, in
recent years-and especially in the context of the European
sovereign debt crisis-it has become increasingly clear that, under
the right circumstances, sovereign defaults might trigger global
systemic risk. Academic literature has focused on three main factors
to explain this risk.
First, the Basel rules have encouraged financial institutions to hold
OECD government debt in their portfolio. Sovereign debt has usually
been considered a no-risk or low-risk financial instrument because of
the assumed unlimited repayment capacity of states.'55 Basel I
underscores this assumption,5 6 which gave sovereign debt from
OECD member countries a zero risk profile when calculating
required capital. 5 7 Basel II and Basel III, while removing the explicit
preference for OECD country debt, nonetheless achieved the same
result, as they allow national supervisors to decide autonomously the
risk profile of their national debt.'58 Governments are therefore
154. For instance, when in 1340 King Edward III of England defaulted on his
debt, two of the major Florentine banks, the Peruzzi bank and the Bardi bank, went
bankrupt. See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS
DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 69-70 (2009) (commenting on
England's progression from experiencing "sovereign external default" to
eventually the status of "nondefaulter").
155. Former Citibank Chairman Walter Wriston succinctly explained the
proclivity of financial institutions to lend to sovereigns in the famous statement,
"Countries don't go out of business .... The infrastructure doesn't go away, the
productivity of the people doesn't go away, the natural resources don't go away.
And so their assets always exceed their liabilities, which is the technical reason for
bankruptcy. And that's very different from a company." Money Matters: An IMF
Exhibit-The Importance of Global Cooperation, Debt and Transition (1981-
1989), INT'L MONETARY FUND (last visited Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.imf.org/
external/np/exr/center/mm/eng/mm_dt_01 .htm.
156. See generally BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL
CONVERGENCE ON CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS 2 (1988)
(examining "the risk of counterparty failure," "interest rate risk," and "investment
risk on securities" to determine overall capital adequacy).
157. See SIMON GLEESON, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF BANKING: CAPITAL
AND RISK REQUIREMENTS 115 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter GLEESON,
INTERNATIONAL REGULATION] (arguing the result will be the same as Basel I
because sovereigns will be incentivized to give a zero risk profile to their national
sovereign debt).
158. Dani~le Nouy, Is Sovereign Risk Properly Addressed by Financial
Regulation?, 16 FIN. STABILITY REV. 95, 98-99 (2012).
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incentivized to give a very low-risk profile to their debt to encourage
banks to buy it. By having a large portfolio of government bonds,
banks can reduce the level of capital buffer required by the Basel
rules.15 9 Thus, while the return of sovereign bonds seldom matched
that of other financial instruments, it guaranteed a cushion to banks
against market fluctuations. Given the apparently low-risk status of
sovereign bonds, banks have also used it as collateral for their own
financing. 160
Second, OECD countries are now among the most indebted
countries, with an average external debt-to-GDP ratio of around
100%.161 For a few countries, most of the sovereign debt is held by
national banks. 162 The combination of those two factors doubles the
global systemic risk potential of a sovereign default because a
banking crisis might turn into a sovereign debt crisis and vice-
versa. 163 Economists define this situation as the "vicious circle"
between banks and sovereigns.'6 The recent Spanish and Irish crises
demonstrated this when the bailout of the national financial systems
by the national governments led the two countries to the verge of
default. 165
159. See id. (indicating that banks must have more liquid assets to meet
"liquidity needs" under Basel III).
160. For the interbank secured funding market, or repo operations with central
banks.
161. For up-to-date data, see TRADING ECONOMICS, http://www.trading
economics.com (last visited Apr. 17, 2015).
162. See Silvia Merler & Jean Pisani-Ferry, Hazardous Tango: Sovereign-Bank
Interdependence and Financial Stability in the Euro Area, 16 FIN. STABILITY REV.
201, 207-08 (2012) (explaining, between 2007 and 2011, the national holdings of
debt have increased for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Italy as the risk
associated with the debt increases).
163. See id. at 209 (discussing the policy implications of the interconnectedness
between sovereign debt and national holdings and the stability of national debt).
164. On the vicious link between banks and sovereigns, and how it develops,
see id. at 209 and Lucrezia Reichlin & Luis Garicano, Squaring the Eurozone's
Vicious Circle, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/lucrezia-reichlin-and-luis-garicano-offer-three-options-
for-severing-the-link-between-sovereign-debt-risk-and-domestic-banking-stabiity.
165. See Federico Lupo-Pasini, Economic Stability and Economic Governance
in the Euro Area: What the European Crisis Can Teach on the Limits of Economic
Integration, 16 J. INT'L ECON. L. 211, 239 (2013) [Lupo-Pasini, Economic




Third, sovereign lending has become more sophisticated and
complicated in form, increasing the systemic risk potential of
sovereign default. 166 Over the last ten years, derivatives--especially
credit default swaps-have entered the sovereign debt market.
67
These instruments, which are purchased by banks and institutional
investors, serve the fundamental function of insuring the lender
against sovereign debt risk. However, they also increase the systemic
effect of a sovereign default because they spread the risks of default
to the broader financial market.
168
3. Common Infrastructures
The payment network is fundamental to the proper function of
financial systems. At the domestic level, payment systems are
divided into net payment systems, in which the various positions
between banks are netted and settled at the end of the day, and real-
time gross settlement systems, in which the settlements are
immediate. 16 9 At the international level, however, the payment
166. Sovereign debt takes many forms. Until the 1960s, bonds were the main
sources of finance for sovereigns. For a short period, from the 1960s until 1982,
syndicated bank loans became the favored mechanism. Eventually, from the late
1980s onward, states shifted back to bonds. See James M. Hays, The Sovereign
Debt Dilemma, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 905, 905-06, 913 (2010); Philip J. Power,
Sovereign Debt: The Rise of the Secondary Market and Its Implications For Future
Restructurings, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 2701, 2764 (1996).
167. The most common form of derivatives is the so-called Credit Default
Swaps. See, e.g., Regis Brenton et al., Banks, Moral Hazard, and Public Debts, 16
FIN. STABILITY REv. 57, 58-59 (2012); Ren6 M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and
the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 74 (2010); Udaibir S. Das et al.,
Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized
Facts 57 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/12/203, 2012).
168. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An
Analytical Comparison, 2 HARv. BUS. L. REV. 95, 97 (2012) (analyzing the
tendency for the increase in sovereign bonds to cause global financial collapse);
see also Louise Story, Derivatives Cloud the Possible Fallout From a Greek
Default, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/23/
business/global/23swaps.html?_r=0 (looking at the consequences of derivatives in
the context of the Grecian default); Elena Kalotychou et al., What Makes Systemic
Risk Systemic?: Contagion and Spillovers in the International Sovereign Debt
Market 1 (H.K. Inst. Monetary Research, Working Paper No. 07/2014, 2014),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2423184 (analyzing the spread of sovereign
bonds and the impact on the collapse of the European market).
169. See Lastra, Systemic Risk, supra note 65, at 203-04 (examining the
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system is more complicated because payment transactions need to be
converted into foreign currency. Economists usually describe an
international foreign exchange or securities transaction as relying on
"two legs," as each transaction needs to be conducted in two
different financial systems and at different times. 170
During the global financial crisis, the international payment
system worked well. 17' However, this was not always the case.
Contagion in the international payment network can occur when one
of the two legs in the payment transaction stops functioning. 17 This
can happen for a variety of reasons, including currency mismatches,
technical problems in the transmission of the payment, or regulatory
interventions.'73 A key example is the failure of the German bank
Herstatt in 1974, whose high impact led to the creation of the
BCBS. 74 Herstatt was a bank dealing with foreign exchange
transactions located in Cologne, Germany, but with substantial
operations in the United States. When the German authorities
decided to liquidate it, they did not consider the effects that a forced
closure would have on Herstatt's counterparties in the United States.
Ultimately, the U.S. counterparties were responsible for the Deutsche
Mark deliveries made and the pending settlements, despite the
German liquidation.'75
C. GLOBAL INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND SYSTEMIC INSTABILITY
Over the years, interconnectedness has become a fundamental
component of modem financial systems. According to the Chair of
payment and settlement systems in the context of the 2007-2009 financial crisis).
170. See id. (analyzing risk created by the national banking system, including
"Herstatt risk," which arises because of time differences, and efforts to combat
these payment issues by developing a "delivery versus payment" system, which
simultaneously settles both "legs").
171. See id. (noting, despite the chaos of the 2007-2009 financial crisis, "money
transmission mechanisms" for the payment system continued to function well at
the operational, liquidity, credit, and legal risk levels).
172. See id. (commenting on the tendency of financia l institutions to experience
problems with payment systems, on either "leg," due operational, liquidity, credit,
or legal failures).
173. See id. (discussing operational, legal, and liquidity risk with regard to
payment and settlement systems).
174. See CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING
SUPERVISION: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY YEARS 1974-1997 25-47 (2011).
175. See LASTRA, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1, at 145.
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the Federal Reserve Board, Janet Yellen, who is charged with
overseeing U.S. monetary policy, "there is little doubt that some
degree of interconnectedness is vital to the functioning of our
financial system. 17 6 Many of the benefits of a network system have
already been mentioned in this article. 177 However, during the
financial crisis of 2008, it became clear that a network is a double-
edged sword. 71
While linkages might act as "shock absorbers" by spreading and
diluting the risk across the whole system, they might nonetheless
expose individual institutions to external shocks from the market or
partner institutions. For instance, one institution might reduce its
holding in certain assets, which in turn might reduce the asset's
market price and thus the solvency of other institutions holding the
same assets. 179
Within a certain level of interdependence, financial
interconnectedness serves to distribute risks and absorb shocks.
However, beyond a certain level of interdependence and during
widespread market contractions or severe shocks, interconnectedness
will only increase the possibility of contagion. Paradoxically, as was
confirmed empirically during the 2008 financial crisis, institutions
that are less connected in the system are less likely to "receive"
instability and are therefore better positioned to withstand severe
financial shocks. 180
IV. THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC POLICIES
Interconnectedness does not by itself create instability. Rather,
instability occurs when an event within the network creates a shock
176. Yellen, supra note 34, at 3.
177. See discussion supra Part II.A (listing the benefits of a network).
178. See discussion supra Part II.A (listing the drawbacks of a network).
179. See Jeffrey Gordon & Colin Mayer, The Micro, Macro and International
Design of Financial Regulation I (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
422, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2047436 (elaborating on the
interconnectedness of the global financial system, wherein the collapse of one
financial institution can cause a country-wide economic crisis, which leads to a
global economic crisis).
180. But see Acemoglu et al., supra note 13, at 564-65 (detailing the benefits of
interconnectedness, which allows the losses of one bank to be spread across the
financial system, which reduces the negative impact on other financial institutions
within the system).
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that is then transmitted to the larger financial system through various
channels of contagion, as discussed in Part I.181 Thus far, mainstream
economic theory has focused on market failures as the underlying
cause of instability.1 2 However, the focus on market failures does
not address the problems faced by international networks because it
presumes a fundamental element that is not present in the global
financial system: a centralized regulator.
As stated previously, the global financial system consists of
integrated financial markets that are subject to divergent national
regulations and policies.I 3 These different state preferences are often
the origin of financial instability.'84 This section analyzes the
political and economic dynamics at the origin of market failures and
classifies them into two major groups: (i) policy and regulatory
asymmetries and (ii) government failures.
A. ASYMMETRIES
Regulatory or policy differences have traditionally been analyzed
only in terms of barriers of entry for foreign firms, or in the context
of debate on international regulatory competition.'85 However,
181. See discussion supra Part I; see also Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 23,
at 1372 (explaining the domino model of contagion, which proposes the collapse
of one bank leads directly to negative impacts on other banks within the first
bank's network and these impacts affect the market indirectly); Schwarcz,
Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 25, at 816 (detailing how the collapse of
financial markets or firms impedes capital availability or increases its cost);
Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, supra note 25, at 196-97 (comparing different definitions
of systemic risk, which approach the system from positive, neutral, and negative
angles).
182. See discussion supra Part II.A.
183. See discussion supra Part II.B.
184. See discussion supra Part II.B.
185. For instance, there is a vast literature on the benefits and costs of
regulatory competition in enhancing economic efficiency and on the risk of a
regulatory race to the bottom. For a substantive overview of the theories, see
Stavros Gadinis, The Politics of Competition in International Financial
Regulation, 49 Harv. Int'l L.J. 447, 449-50 (2008) [hereinafter Gadinis, The
Politics of Competition]. A stream of political science literature argued that
financial globalization, and especially the mobility of capital, would drive states to
a permanent condition of regulatory competition in which each government would
be pushed to lower its regulatory apparatus to attract foreign capital. See Philip G.
Cerny, The Dynamics of Financial Globalization: Technology, Market Structure,
and Policy Response, 27 Pol'y Sci. 319, 319-20 (1994). Other authors, however,
argued that regulatory competition would lead to a race to the top in financial
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regulatory and policy asymmetries can also increase the likelihood of
global systemic risk.
Asymmetries affecting global financial stability are the result of
two independent, albeit often intertwined, factors. The first arises
from the inability of national regulators to take into account the
externalities of their actions on other countries due to a principal-
agent problem. The second arises from the natural macroeconomic
asymmetries that prevent the adoption of Pareto optimal policies.
Each factor is examined in turn.
1. Principal-Agent Problem in Global Financei s6
In any national financial system, regulators perform a pivotal role
in maintaining financial stability. Not only do they have the power to
supervise and regulate financial institutions, they also have the power
to intervene and stabilize markets when a crisis erupts. They do so
services. See Mahmood Bagheri & Chizu Nakajima, Optimal Level of Financial
Regulation Under the GATS: A Regulatory Competition and Cooperation
Framework for Capital Adequacy and Disclosure of Information, 5 J. Int'l Econ.
L. 507, 508 (2002); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws,
International Money: Regulation in a Global Capital Market, 65 Fordham L. Rev.
1855, 1857 (1997); see also David Andrew Singer, Regulating Capital: Setting
Standards for the International Financial System 4-5 (2007); Howell E. Jackson,
Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial Regulation, 2
Theoretical Inquiries L. 649, 650 (2001); Joel P. Trachtman, Recent Initiatives in
International Financial Regulation and Goals of Competitiveness, Effectiveness,
Consistency and Cooperation, 12 NW. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 241, 246 (1994); Roberta
Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions:
Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture 3 (Yale Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 452, 2013), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=2127749. The same theory ignited a long argument between U.S.
scholars with regard to regulatory competition within the United States. See
Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 1-13 (1993); William
L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J.
663, 705 (1974).
186. The principal-agent theory was originally developed by the institutional
economics literature to analyze information problems in industrial organizations
and it has been widely used by the economics literature to explain the information
asymmetry problems that arise between bank management and bank depositors.
For a general overview of the principal-agent model, see Michelle Egan,
Regulatory Strategies, Delegation and European Market Integration, 5 J. EUR.
PUB. POL'Y 485, 485 (1998). For a more extensive analysis, see TIMOTHY BESLEY,
PRINCIPLED AGENTS? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF GOOD GOVERNMENT 485-87
(2006).
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through different mechanisms, such as "lender of last resort," 187
operations provided by central banks, fresh capital injections
provided by treasuries, forced mergers, creation of good and bad
banks, bail-ins, and through bankruptcy regimes. 8' In performing all
those operations, national regulators usually enjoy a wide margin of
discretion, albeit to different degrees. 89 In spite of their relative
freedom, however, both monetary and financial authorities suffer one
fundamental constraint: they need to ensure the stability of their own
national financial system.19° More specifically, virtually all statutes
187. For a quick overview on lenders of last resort, see Kern Alexander,
International Economic Law and the Lender of Last Resort, INT'L MONETARY
FUND 3 (Oct. 23-27, 2006), https://www.imf.org/External/NP/seminars/eng/2006/
mfl/ka.pdf. See also Andrew Campbell & Rosa Lastra, Revisiting the Lender of
Last Resort, 24 BANKING FIN. L. REv. 453 (2009); Xavier Freixas et al., Lender of
Last Resort: A Review of the Literature, 2 FIN. STABILITY REv. 151 (1999); Freixas
et al., Systemic Risk, supra note 17; Xavier Freixas et al., The Lender of Last
Resort: A 21st Century Approach, 2 J. EURO. ECON. ASS'N 1085 (2004); Rosa
Maria Lastra, Lender of Last Resort: An International Perspective, 48 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 340 (1999); Guillermo Rosas, Bagehot or Bailout? An Analysis of
Government Responses to Banking Crises, 50 AM. J. POL. SC. 175 (2006); Anna J.
Schwartz, The Lender of Last Resort and the Federal Safety Net, 1 J. FIN.
SERVICES REs. 1 (1987).
188. For a comprehensive overview of the different mechanisms to contain
financial instability, see FINANCIAL CRISIS CONTAINMENT AND GOVERNMENT
GUARANTEES (John LaBrosse et al. eds., 2012), Steven M. Davidoff & David
Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's Response to the Financial Crisis,
61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009), and Anna Gelpem, Financial Crisis Containment,
41 CONN. L. REv. 1051 (2009).
189. See ROSA MARIA LASTRA, CENTRAL BANKING AND BANKING
REGULATIONS 108-44 (2006) (arguing that, while monetary authorities are
frequently independent, financial authorities and treasuries are regularly exposed to
external political influences); Stavros Gadinis, From Independence To Politics In
Financial Regulation, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 327, 327, 332-33 (2013) (elaborating
that the United States uses its traditional separation of powers philosophy to deal
with the issue of external political influences in relation to the independence of
monetary authorities); Lorenzo Bini-Smaghi, Central Bank Independence in the
EU: From Theory to Practice, 14 EUR. L.J. 446, 447 (2008) (noting that policy
makers have delineated specific obligations for political authorities to deal with the
issue of external political influences).
190. See Aneta Spendzharova, Is More 'Brussels' the Solution? New European
Union Member States' Preferences about the European Financial Architecture, 50
J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 315, 3 16 (2012) (emphasizing that cooperation among
central authorities is essential to the stability of the entire financial system);
Marianne Ojo, The Changing Role of Central Banks and the Role of Competition
in Financial Regulation During (and in the Aftermath oJ) the Financial Crisis, 17
EUR. L.J. 513 (2011) (discussing the need for stability throughout her article as
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of central bank and financial authorities limit the policy objective of
the agencies to what is considered optimal for the national economy,
rather than for the global economy.'91 At the core of the authority's
behavior lies a bond between the regulators-who act as agents-
and their citizens-who act as principals. 192
Promoting regulatory efficiency does not, in the majority of cases,
create global systemic risk, even in an integrated financial network.
However, in certain circumstances, the pursuit of national interests
might lead to global instability that reverberates across the whole
system. 193 The most relevant example arises in the context of a cross-
border banking crisis. 94 G-SIFIs rely on an integrated network,
which means that a solvency or liquidity problem in the parent bank
or in one of its foreign operations is immediately felt across the
entire consolidated structure. 19 The global systemic risk potential of
G-SIFIs is compounded by the fact that their systemic importance
may vary in each of the countries where they operate. For instance,
while a cross-border bank headquartered in a large developed
country might be of medium systemic importance for that economy,
its operations in a developing country with an underdeveloped and
highly connected financial sector might be of major systemic
importance. 196 Consequently, home and host regulators likely hold
"paramount"); Louis W. Pauly, The Old and the New Politics of International
Financial Stability, 47 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 955, 960-61 (2009) (explaining
that during the 2008 financial crisis, national governments were forced to support
internal clearing banks and global intermediaries).
191. See Francois Gianviti, The Objectives of Central Banks, in
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW: THE GLOBAL CRISIS 449, 449-
83 (Mario Giovanoli & Diego Devos eds., 2010).
192. Id.
193. See, e.g., Michael H. Moskow, Cross-Border Banking Forces Driving
Change and Resulting Regulatory Challenge, in CROSS-BORDER BANKING:
REGULATORY CHALLENGES 3-5 (Gerard Caprio Jr. et al. eds., 2006).
194. See generally id. (highlighting regulation in cross-boarder banking).
195. See generally SCHOENMAKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 141,
at 34 (explaining that because the level of centralization varies according to the
business model, banks that adopt a fully centralized model usually operate through
branches and collect their capital and debt from the headquarters, while banks that
rely on a decentralized model operate through subsidiaries; nevertheless, banks
frequently adopt a hybrid model that combines both).
196. See STUN CLAESSENS ET AL., A SAFER WORLD FINANCIAL SYSTEM:
IMPROVING THE RESOLUTION OF SYSTEMIC INSTITUTIONS 29-32 (2010)
(considering asymmetries in banks' national interests in home and host countries).
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different incentives when deciding how the G-SIFIs' problems will
be resolved.
The principal-agent relationship between national financial
authorities and their citizens prevents national authorities from
effectively intervening to maintain the stability of cross-border
banks. 197 Because political leaders' main goal is to safeguard national
interests-in terms of fiscal outlays or financial stability-they will
intervene only to the extent necessary to achieve their national
mandate.'98 The principal-agent problem affects financial stability
during all stages of the resolution procedure.'99 If the G-SIFI must be
bailed-out, the home state might not be inclined to provide taxpayer-
funded financial assistance to the bank's foreign operations unless
necessary to guarantee domestic stability."°
This creates a monstrous problem for the host country, which is
left to deal with the systemic impact of the bank's failure alone. This
is well illustrated by the dissolution of the Icelandic Landsbanki bank
in 2008.201 Landsbanki was headquartered in Iceland, but had foreign
operations branches in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the
Netherlands. 2  At the onset of the Icelandic banking crisis, the
197. See Katia D'Hulster, Cross Border Banking Supervision: Incentive
Conflicts in Supervisory Information Sharing between Home and Host Supervisors
1-2 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5871, 2011), available at
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5871 (acknowledging
that banking supervisors overlook "cross border externalities").
198. See SCHOENMAKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 141, at 34.
199. See D'Hulster, supra note 197, at 28.
200. See Xavier Freixas, Crisis Management in Europe, in FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION IN EUROPE 102 (Jeroen Kremers et al. eds., 2003); Garry J. Schinasi
& Pedro Gustavo Teixeira, The Lender of Last Resort in the European Single
Financial Market, in CROSS-BORDER BANKING: REGULATORY CHALLENGES 349
(Gerard Caprio Jr. et al. eds., 2006); Vitor Gaspar & Garry Schinasi, Financial
Stability and Policy Cooperation 1, 26 (Banco de Port., Occasional Papers No.
01/2010, 2010) (explaining that, while the issue of taxpayer-funded financial
assistance has been analyzed constantly in economics literature, whenever the
failure of the branch insolvency threatens the stability of the parent bank, taxpayer-
funded assistance must be minimalized unless it is necessary to ensure domestic
stability).
201. See Fridrik M. Baldursson & Richard Portes, Capital Controls and the
Resolution of Failed Cross-Border Banks: the Case of Iceland, 9 CAPITAL
MARKETS L.J. 40 (2014).
202. See RANNSOKNARNEFND ALDINGIS, Causes of the Collapse of the Icelandic
Banks: Responsibility, Mistakes, and Negligence, in REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
INVESTIGATION COMMISSION 1, 42 (2012).
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Icelandic authorities failed to provide support to Landsbanki's
foreign operations, as they believed that providing equity injections
would strain their already limited fiscal capacity. 23 They also refused
to compensate foreign depositors, contrary to E.U. law.20 4 As a result,
English and Dutch depositors were left completely alone, and only
the last minute intervention of host regulators prevented the crisis
from escalating.2 °5
Different bank insolvency regimes might similarly create global
instability.0 6 Countries' bankruptcy laws often differ greatly with
regard to various aspects of the bankruptcy procedure, from the very
definition of "bankruptcy" to the level of seniority of different
creditors.20 7 In the absence of a harmonized bank insolvency
framework, when a cross-border bank reaches the point of non-
viability, each national resolution authority where the bank operates
203. See id. at 144.
204. See id. at 96.
205. See M. Elvira M6ndez-Pinedo, The Icesave Saga: Iceland Wins Battle
Before the EFTA Court, 1 MICH. J. INT'L L. EMERGING SCHOLARSHIP PROJECT
101, 101 (2013); see also M. Elvira Mendez-Pinedo, Iceland and the EU: Bitter
Lessons after the Bank Collapse and the Icesave Dispute, in CONTEMPORARY
LEGAL AND ECON. ISSUES III 9, 12, 14 (Ivana Barkovid Bojani6 & Mira Luli6 eds.,
2013) (noting that although Dutch and British regulators prevented the crisis,
Iceland remained obligated to "provide the minimum compensation of EUR
20.000 per depositor").
206. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-BORDER BANK RESOLUTION GROUP 1, 4 (2010)
(discussing comparative burdens by national authorities during cross-border
crises); LEGAL AND MONETARY DEP'T, INT'L MONETARY FUND, RESOLUTION OF
CROSS-BORDER BANKS: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR ENHANCED
COORDINATION 3 (2010) [hereinafter IMF, RESOLUTION OF CROSS-BORDER
BANKS]; Michael Krimminger, Banking in a Changing World: Issues and
Questions in the Resolution of Cross-Border Banks, in CROSS-BORDER BANKING:
REGULATORY CHALLENGES, supra note 193, at 401, 403.
207. See EVA H.G. HUPKES, THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF BANK INSOLVENCY: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WESTERN EUROPE, THE UNITED STATES, AND
CANADA 3 (2000); Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. et al., Two Cheers for Territoriality: An
Essay on International Bank Insolvency Law, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 57, 73-76
(2004); LASTRA, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 1; Rosa Maria Lastra, Cross-
Border Bank Insolvency: Legal Implications in the Case of Banks Operating in
Different Jurisdictions in Latin America, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 79, 90 (2003)
[hereinafter Lastra, Legal Implications] (emphasizing that bankruptcy proceedings
are generally held to the plurality rule for which they are "only effective in the
country in which they are initiated" and describing the controversial nature and
unclear definition of bank insolvency).
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has the right to initiate an independent bankruptcy procedure based
on local law.208
Asymmetries in bankruptcy laws incentivize national authorities to
protect their own interest, thereby leading to a disorderly
resolution. 0 9 This is especially true with countries that adopt a
territorial approach to bankruptcy, such as the United States. Under
the territorial approach, the local court adjudicates only claims on
local assets and on the part of the bank group located in its
jurisdiction.210 In practice, the court will not recognize other
bankruptcy procedures and will focus only on protecting the local
creditors by ring-fencing all the available assets of the local bank to
the detriment of the creditors of the foreign entities. 211
This approach has a few systemic implications. First, the split of
the bank into national (rather than business) lines during the
bankruptcy procedure reduces the franchise value of the bank group
and therefore increases creditor losses.212 Second, to control the
resolution procedure, national regulators often delay communicating
the real situation of the bank to other regulators and try to locate as
many assets as possible in their jurisdiction before bankruptcy
occurs, thereby leaving the foreign operations illiquid.213 The
dissolution of Lehman Brothers represents a textbook case in this
regard.214 Before communicating their decision to declare Lehman
208. See Lastra, Legal Implications, supra note 207, at 90-91 (describing the
United States' procedure known as the "separate entity approach" applied when
the U.S. branch of a foreign bank is faced with liquidation).
209. See IMF, RESOLUTION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKS, supra note 206, at 9
(positing that when bank insolvencies arise, national frameworks do not properly
facilitate coordination, which is further hindered by a lack of harmonization).
210. See id.
211. See id. at 9-10 (emphasizing that such a "terminal approach" favors the
bank's local jurisdiction such as depositors and creditors while jeopardizing
foreign stakeholders).
212. See id. at 12.
213. Id. at 30 (recommending that there be more effective "cross-border
cooperation and information sharing" by the different national authorities to allow
for more effective insolvency and crisis management).
214. See Michael J. Fleming & Asani Sarkar, The Failure Resolution of Lehman
Brothers, 20 FRBNY ECON. POLY REv. 175, 193-94 (2014) (discussing the




Brothers bankrupt, U.S. regulators managed to repatriate most of the
Lehman Brothers' foreign assets from their European affiliate.215
When Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, the United Kingdom
and German operations were left completely illiquid, thereby
triggering a systemic impact across the whole European financial
system.'1 6
2. Macro Asymmetries and Spillovers
While domestic policies may enhance economic efficiency
domestically, they are nonetheless likely to produce negative
spillovers across borders.2"7  Spillovers take various forms.
Sometimes, domestic economic policies in the home country can
lead to a surge of capital inflows in partner countries.1 8 Indeed,
portfolio flows channeled mainly through cross-border banks and
hedge funds are heavily procyclical, and expansionary monetary
policies in the home country can increase the risk of asset bubbles
and inflation during boom times in partner countries, as well as the
risk of recession during bursts.219 Katharina Pistor, Professor of Law
215. See id. at 199.
216. SCHOENMAKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 141, at 74-75
(noting that Lehman Brother Holdings Inc. controlled access to cash resources and
the subsidiaries located in Europe and Asia became illiquid and the firm was
unable to operate properly because Lehman declared bankruptcy before dividing
the cash allocations amongst its subsidiaries).
217. See, e.g., INT'L MONETARY FUND, 2012 SPILLOVER REPORT 3 (2012)
[hereinafter IMF, SPILLOVER REPORT]; see also INT'L MONETARY FUND, PILOT
EXTERNAL SECTOR REPORT 1 (2012) [hereinafter IMF, PILOT REPORT].
218. See IMF, PILOT REPORT, supra note 217, at I (advocating for a more
clearly delineated policy framework for the flow of capital from an "advanced
country core"); IMF, SPILLOVER REPORT, supra note 217; MONETARY & CAPITAL
MKTS. DEP'T, INT'L MONETARY FUND, THE MULTILATERAL ASPECTS OF POLICIES
AFFECTING CAPITAL FLOWS 3 (2011) (reinforcing that financial crises can cause
capital inflows into emerging markets and "safe haven" currencies); Atish R. Gosh
et al., Surges 5, 23 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/12/22, 2012)
(noting that a surge in capital, whether brought upon by real U.S. interest rates or
international instability, can be the result of the economic policies of other
countries); Carmen M. Reinhart & Vincent R. Reinhart, Capital Flow Bonanzas:
An Encompassing View of the Past and Present 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 14321, 2008) (discussing how the positive economic change
can "lull[] policymakers and investors into treating the bonanza as a permanent
phenomenon and not a temporary shock").
219. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, RECENT EXPERIENCES IN MANAGING
CAPITAL INFLOWS: CROSS-CUT7ING THEMES AND POSSIBLE POLICY FRAMEWORK
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at Columbia Law School, argues that financial policies in Western
Europe during the 1990s created asset bubbles in Eastern European
countries, ultimately leading to financial crises in the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Hungary.2"
More recently, the unconventional monetary measures adopted by
central banks in developed economies to boost growth are believed
to have caused the same negative spillovers in emerging
economies. 2 ' As the 2008 financial crisis unfolded, interest rates in
advanced economies reached zero, thereby preventing monetary
authorities from using interest rates to address monetary stability
concerns.22 As a consequence, monetary authorities had to revert to
financial policies and shift the focus of their intervention. 23 In the
United States, Japan, and England, central banks set up an
unconventional program consisting of a prolonged purchase of public
bonds and financial assets-so-called quantitative easing-that
pumped vast liquidity into the system, thus reducing real interest
rates. 24 While revitalizing sluggish domestic economic growth and
4-5 (2011) (noting that in recent years, excessive capital outflows from advanced
economies have often created problems in emerging economies; for instance,
Brazil and other emerging markets have complained about the negative effects of
excessive global liquidity on monetary stability); Jonathan D. Ostry et al., Capital
Inflows: The Role of Controls 1, 6-10 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Staff Position Note
No. SPN/10/04, 2010) [hereinafter Ostry et al., Capital Inflows] (acknowledging
macroeconomic concerns regarding capital inflows, which include "excessive
foreign borrowing," "foreign currency exposure," "credit booms," and "asset
bubbles").
220. Katharina Pistor, Host's Dilemma: Rethinking EU Banking Regulation in
Light of the Global Crisis 34 (Columbia Law Sch. & European Corporate
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 286/2010, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id-1631940.
221. Marcel Fratzscher et al., On the International Spillovers of US
Quantitative Easing 1, 10 (European Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1557, 2013).
222. See INT'L ORG. OF SUPREME AUDIT INSTS., THE CAUSES OF THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SUPREME AUDIT INSTITUTIONS 13
(2010) (describing that the years preceding the financial crisis were fiscally
unsustainable due in part to low interest rates and a reluctance by investors to
purchase government debt).
223. See IMF, SPILLOVER REPORT, supra note 217 (emphasizing that it is
important to revert to financial policies to create further stability and to avoid
fundamental global financial vulnerability).
224. See Brett W. Fawley & Christopher J. Neely, Four Stories of Quantitative
Easing, 95 FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS R. 51, 52 (2013) (explaining that
unconventional monetary policies such as quantitative easing arise in the form of
asset purchases and loan programs, which can have the effect of easing credit
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safeguarding financial stability in the developed countries, these
measures nevertheless increased global liquidity and led to a
dangerous surge of capital inflows in emerging economies.225
Sometimes spillovers are the result of different prudential
policies. 2 6 The decline in asset value in one country, might induce
banks to cut back foreign loans or to shift into low-risk assets, such
as government securities, in order to adjust their capital adequacy
ratios. 227 Thomas Moser, previous Executive Director for the Kyrgyz
Republic, defines this situation as "portfolio rebalancing due to
capital constraint.2 2 8 During the Japanese crisis in the early 1990s,
the capital buffers Basel I imposed on Japanese banks led to a
reduction of loans from Japanese banks in the United States.229
B. GOVERNMENT FAILURES
A very common source of global systemic risk is government
failure.23° Such failures arise from the inability of governments to
strains).
225. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, MULTILATERAL POLICY ISSUES REPORT: 2013
SPILLOVER REPORT 1, 42-43 (2013) (highlighting the external impacts of
quantitative easing); Fratzscher et al., supra note 221, at 9-10 (commenting that
quantitative and credit easing policies via capital inflows affect global asset
prices). But see Peter J. Morgan, Impact of US Quantitative Easing Policy on
Emerging Asia 17 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 321, 2011),
available at http://www.adbi.org/working- paper/2011/11/18/4796.impact.us.
quantitative.easing.policy.emerging.asia/ (arguing that the controversial affects of
quantitative easing by the United States on some emerging markets are
significantly exaggerated).
226. See Olivier Jeanne, Macroprudential Policies in a Global Perspective 1
(Oct. 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco) (highlighting domestic macroprudential policies and prudential
capital controls as the primary generator of international spillover).
227. See Whelan, supra note 72, at 8 (explaining that a single financial
institution's decline in the value of assets can lead to other institutions' failure to
"roll over" loans which in affect results in systemic defensive actions and
jeopardizes the entire interconnected financial system).
228. Moser, supra note 49, at 167-68 (providing an example of these defensive
actions in the Japanese stock market decline in the early 1990s).
229. See Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, The International Transmission of
Financial Shocks: The Case of Japan, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 495, 501 (1997); see
also Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank
Crisis on Real Activity in the United States, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 30, 30 (2000)
(concentrating specifically on the effects of Japanese "loan supply shocks" on the
U.S. economy).
230. See Ian Goldin & Tiffany Vogel, Global Governance and Systemic Risk in
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address economic problems through appropriate regulation or timely
policy intervention.23' International finance is particularly prone to
global systemic risks arising from government failures because, as
discussed earlier, the global financial system relies on vertical
integration between the public and financial sectors, and also on
horizontal integration between national financial sectors.232
Unsustainable monetary or fiscal policies are thus immediately
transmitted to the local financial system and then spread across the
entire global financial network.233
In the context of global systemic risk, government failures have
historically been associated with sovereign debt or currency crises in
developing countries.234 However, recent events have shown that
government failures are no longer the exclusive preserve of unstable
political institutions, crony capitalism, or underdeveloped
economies. To the contrary, most systemic risks caused by
government policy now originate from developed and systemically
important countries with diverse economic policies and with highly
sophisticated institutional frameworks. 235 Government failures can
take many shapes and have different impacts. However, in the
context of global systemic risk, sovereign defaults and regulatory
failures are particularly relevant. The next section addresses the
peculiar political and economic factors that originated these failures.
the 21st Century: Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 1 GLOBAL POL'Y 4, 7-8
(2010) (discussing deregulation and derivative regulations in the context of
government failures to highlight the ease with which firm and individual financial
actors circumvented regulations because of misaligned incentives).
231. See Barak Orbach, What Is Government Failure?, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 44,
45 (2013) (examining the role of government regulation in the free market and the
origins and nature of "government failure").
232. See Scott, Reduction of Systemic Risk, supra note 8, at 728, 730, 733
(discussing the importance of both vertical and horizontal integration).
233. See Acharya & Yornlmazer, supra note 3, at 32 (talking about the ex-ante
aspect of system risk).
234. See Ross P. BUCKLEY & DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS:
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURES 1, 7-12, 14 (2011)
(noting that the IMF has even implemented a system to address this issue whereby
it can declare a country's currency a scarce currency, allowing countries to be
more financially cautious with at-risk developing countries in an effort to mitigate
global systemic risk).
235. See id. at 20-21 (discussing capital markets' evolution and innovation
whereupon this new globalization has led to the interconnectedness of debt and
equity of developed and developing countries).
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1. The Time Consistency Problem in Sovereign Debt
Sovereign debt crises are, perhaps, the quintessential example of
government failures. 36 The reasons sovereigns choose not to service
their debt on time differ widely. In some cases, it is the result of
macroeconomic mismanagement or broader political failures, while
in others it is the result of prolonged slow growth or adverse
economic circumstances.237 These section focuses on two intertwined
problems that the recent Eurozone crisis highlighted: time
consistency and excessive indebtedness.238
Sovereign debt contracts are agreements in which the debtor
performs over a long period of time, often times up to thirty years,
after the contract is signed.239 During the period of time that separates
the borrowing decision from the actual servicing of the debt,
circumstances in the debtor's country may change. As a
consequence, a government previously committed to paying off a
loan to satisfy short-term interests may no longer be willing to pay.24°
Because those who bear the costs of funding are not those who enjoy
the benefits, sovereign contracts suffer from what economists call the
"time consistency" problem. 4'
Sovereign borrowing is, in essence, a redistributive policy across
generations. If those who bore the costs of sovereign financing also
236. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 154 (discussing King Edward III of
England defaulting on his debt).
237. See generally Mark L.J. Wright, Theory of Sovereign Debt and Default, in
HANDBOOK OF SAFEGUARDING GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY: POLITICAL,
SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND ECONOMIC THEORIES AND MODELS, supra note 54, at
187, 192 (analyzing the risks and benefits associated with sovereign debt servicing
default and roll-overs).
238. See BARRY EICHENGREEN ET AL., PUBLIC DEBTS: NUTS, BOLTS AND
WORRIES 16-17, 30 (2011) [hereinafter EICHENGREEN ET AL., PUBLIC DEBTS]
(acknowledging the "common pool" problem facing government financing and
discussing the "time consistency" problem, which stems from the competing
benefits of long term fiscal discipline and short term stability).
239. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Political Risk and Sovereign Debt Contracts 2
(John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 583, 2011) (explaining the
characteristics of sovereign debt, the structure of sovereign bonds, and the political
risks those contracts pose).
240. See id.
241. See Mark Hallerberg & Jiirgen von Hagen, Electoral Institutions, Cabinet
Negotiations, and Budget Deficits in the European Union 209 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6341, 1997).
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enjoyed the benefits of the increased level of credit, they would
probably choose a level of sovereign indebtedness that was equal to
it social or political benefit. However, the two groups are separated
by a generational gap, often up to thirty years; therefore, those who
benefit from higher levels of spending tend to undervalue the costs of
repayment because it is borne by future generations . 42 Thus, the real
risk is that sovereigns might borrow "beyond the point at which the
social cost of one additional unit of debt equals the social benefit of
an additional unit of debt-financed government expenditure. 243
Surprisingly, it is often the developed and systemically important
countries that have the higher levels of sovereign indebtedness. 44 For
instance, Italy has a debt-GDP ratio of 132%, Greece of 174%,
Belgium of 101%, and France of 92%; compared to 57% in Brazil,
37% in Mexico, and 32% in Colombia. 45
The political problems of sovereign debt apply to both the
borrowing and repaying of debt. At the time of borrowing, the
government can be strongly motivated to over-borrow.246 Aside from
the difficulty of reliably calculating the long-term growth prospects
of the country to inform the decision to borrow, democratic leaders
seeking reelection are motivated by a need to please their electorates.
They have a strong political incentive to adopt policies that favor
short-term interests rather than long-term sustainability goals. In the
end, borrowing is the easiest option.247
The same principle applies when repaying the debt. While
democratic governments are in principle reliable in fulfilling their
predecessor's obligations, they nonetheless have little incentive to
assume the political costs attached to it.248 Because the rescheduling
242. See EICHENGREEN ET AL., PUBLIC DEBTS, supra note 238, at 16.
243. LEE C. BUCHHEIT ET AL., REvIsITING SOVEREIGN BANKRUPTCY 8-9 (2013)
(determining that over-borrowing arises from incentives to borrow amounts
exceeding social optimization, moral hazards linked to "pressure of an
international lender of last resort," and the dilution of existing creditors' claims
from lending to countries with higher risk ratings).
244. See TRADING ECONOMICS, supra note 161 (listing the debt levels of
countries).
245. Id.
246. See Choi et al., supra note 239, at 16 (discussing some of the
complications countries face when burdened with sovereign debt).
247. Unlike taxing, borrowing allows the government to finance social projects
without angering the population.
248. See Mark J. Wright, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Problems and
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of sovereign debt is seen as a signal of distress by financial
markets-which might reduce credit lines in the future or, more
importantly, trigger a capital outflow-governments usually default
only when the situation is at a point where it is no longer sustainable,
thereby exacerbating further the systemic implications of the
default.249
Sometimes, such behavior is due to the political stigma associated
with the acceptance of IMF conditions or other forms of external
support.25 0 For instance, during the Eurozone crisis, Greece faced
severe macroeconomic problems and the likelihood of default on its
sovereign debt.25' Even so, after the European Union and the IMF
agreed on a massive €172 billion bailout conditioned on Greece's
acceptance of certain austerity measures, due to the negative political
stigma surrounding a bailout, Greek Prime Minister George
Papandreou threatened to subject the decision of whether to default
or repay the debt to a national referendum.25 2
2. Regulatory Failures
In their seminal book on financial crises, Carmen Reinhart and
Kenneth Rogoff argue that one of the main causes of regulatory
failure is the inability of regulators to understand and regulate the
evolution of the financial sector and its macroeconomic dynamics.
253
In the period leading up to the recent crisis, the international
Prospects, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 153, 175 (2012) (explaining the policy
implications of national debt restructuring).
249. See Anne Krueger, Should Countries Like Argentina Be Able to Declare
Themselves Bankrupt?, EL PAlS (Jan. 18, 2002), http://www.imf.org/extemalInp/
vc/2002/011802.HTM ("Like a toothache sufferer delaying a visit to the dentist
until the last possible moment, governments frequently try to put off the inevitable.
The result is that the citizens of the defaulting country experience greater hardship
than they need to, and the international community has a tougher job helping pick
up the pieces."); see also BUCHHEIT ET AL., supra note 243, at 8-9 (arguing that
default costs play a major role in the sustainability of sovereign debt, lending
philosophy, and lending sustainability).
250. See BUCHHEIT ET AL., supra note 243, at 18-19 (detailing the debt
restructuring problem involving holdouts and potential solutions).




253. See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 154; see also Hallerberg & von
Hagen, supra note 241.
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financial system experienced innovations and technological
developments that regulators did not understand.25 4 The innovations
brought increased complexities and the use of obscure, unregulated,
and overly complex financial products that created a financial time
bomb that ultimately exploded. 5 Perhaps due to a philosophy averse
to state intervention or regulatory capture by powerful lobbyists,
regulators failed to address the systemic risk implications of the new
financial products.256 They adopted financial models that did not take
into account those changes and their impact on systemic stability;
they failed to properly understand the process of securitization and
its potential to create systemic risk, thereby leaving a large sector of
the business of financial intermediation totally unregulated; and they
failed to appreciate the linkages between individual financial
institutions and the market.257
254. Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira, The Global Financial Crisis and a New
Capitalism? 9 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 592, 2010) (noting that these
innovations included the packaging of securities combined with speculation, which
led to wealth increases, "fictitious capital," and elevated leverage).
255. See Awrey, supra note 6, at 275 (commenting on financial innovations that
presented risks in "dealer intermediated markets" combined with a lack of
advisement by contracting parties and financial fraud as system risk enhancers);
Emilios Avgouleas, The Global Financial Crisis, Behavioural Finance and
Financial Regulation: In Search of a New Orthodoxy, 9 J. CORP. L. STUD. 23, 26
(2009) (noting the unprecedented risks banks took by removing assets from the
balance sheets); David G. Tarr, The Political, Regulatory and Market Failures
That Caused the US Financial Crisis 133-54 (World Bank, Policy Research
Working Paper No. 5324, 2010) (highlighting the U.S. financial crisis and the
subprime lending that was introduced to encourage wider home ownership as an
overly complex financial product, which was an inevitable and disastrous
regulatory failure).
256. See Bresser-Pereira, supra note 254, at 9, 18 (discussing the technological
financial product innovations and the causes of systemic risk arising from
deregulation of the 1980s "regulatory reform").
257. See also FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 3, 439 (2011) (explaining that bad information is likely the primary culprit
of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression); Tarr, supra note 255, at 2-
4 (arguing a combination of regulatory failure, market failure, and political failure
are to blame for the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, while
emphasizing that the political failures likely bare the most blame). See generally
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 5, 22 (2009) (providing an example of regulatory failure
in the adoption of the overly complicated risk management assessment technique




Regulatory failures can also arise from the unwillingness or
inability of regulators to maintain an adequate level of supervision. 58
This problem is perhaps more acute in developing countries where
financial authorities are even more constrained in terms of human
and financial resources than they are in developed countries.5 9
However, the problem also arises in developed economies. 2 6°
Governments might choose to adopt lax regulations or supervisory
policies in the hope that they will attract foreign firms to their
markets, or simply to enhance the competitiveness of local firms
against foreign ones.261 In both cases, however, there is a high risk
that a national financial crisis triggered by lax or weak financial
regulation would transcend national boundaries and spread to other
countries.
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Policymakers are continuously confronted with the difficult choice
of balancing financial regulation with competing national interests.
In a domestic setting the regulatory process is the result of political
bargains between different coalitions of depositors, financial
institutions, and regulators. 62 Regulating global financial stability,
258. See Pierre-Hugues Verdier, The Political Economy of International
Financial Regulation, 88 IND. L.J. 1405, 1445 (2013) (noting that in some
countries, implementing regulatory reform can be challenging as various parties
benefit from the financial environment in place).
259. See id.
260. See SINGER, supra note 185, at 60 (describing the pressure applied by
foreign regulators to avoid the Japanese government's resistance from adopting
global risk weighted capital standards imposed following the Anglo-American
Agreement of 1987).
261. See id. (providing that when the first Basel Accord was negotiated in the
early eighties, Japanese authorities were opposed to adopting more stringent
capital requirements, as they understood that the lower capital levels were giving a
decisive advantage to their banks against their American and English competitors).
262. See Edward J. Malesky, Interest Group Politics, in HANDBOOK OF
SAFEGUARDING GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY: POLITICAL, SOCIAL, CULTURAL,
AND ECONOMIC THEORIES AND MODELS, supra note 54 at 1, 59-68 (elaborating on
the political economy of financial regulation); Gadinis, The Politics of
Competition, supra note 185, at 450 (discussing domestic interest group influences
in the regulatory process); see also CALOMIRIS & HABER, supra note 98, (arguing
that the problems plaguing the financial industry are not solely the result of the
industry alone, as society and political institutions play a significant role in the
instability).
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however, is more complicated. First, the tradeoff at the core of the
international regulatory process not only involves competing private
interests, but also a difficult compromise between competing
sovereign rights.263 Second, in the absence of a centralized
regulator-and enforcer-cooperation must rely on international
regulatory regimes that promote win-win situations and ensure a
Pareto-efficient equilibrium, rather than protecting individual Nash-
efficient gains.2 64 Pareto efficiency, however, is not easy to achieve
in global financial markets.2 65 This section analyzes and evaluates the
policies and legal implications in the regulation of global systemic
risk in light of our previous findings.
A. GLOBAL SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE FINANCIAL TRILEMMA
To understand the regulatory tradeoffs involved in the regulation
of global systemic risk, it is useful to rely on a broad conceptual
framework recently developed by the economist Dirk Schoenmaker:
the so-called "financial trilemma. ' '266
The financial trilemma posits that it is impossible for states to
simultaneously achieve three policy objectives: financial integration,
national financial sovereignty, and financial stability.267 First,
financial integration refers to the benefits that firms enjoy from
263. Gadinis, The Politics of Competition, supra note 185, at 450 (providing an
in depth analysis of competing domestic constituencies).
264. See ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN 0. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 504-05 (2012) (describing Pareto efficient policies as those
that enhance the welfare of all states involved compared to policies that exclude
the interests of various states); JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 47 (2008); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman,
Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 47 (1999) (noting
that economists believe markets are Pareto-efficient based on consumer
sovereignty, but when extrapolated to a larger scale, this is not the case); Eric A.
Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 487, 518-22
(2006) (explaining that the Pareto criterion is a system "where world politics,
reflected in international law, will exist only when they make all states better-off").
265. Michael Keen & David Wildasin, Pareto-Efficient International Taxation,
94 AM. ECON. REv. 259, 259 (2004).
266. Dirk Schoenmaker, The Financial Trilemma, 111 ECON. LETTERS 57, 57
(2011) (developing the trilemma to address the conflicting objectives facing
national supervisory authorities in the context of a cross-border banking crisis; it
was used as the theoretical basis for the creation of the Banking Union in the




participating in a global financial network and the benefits that
consumers and sovereigns enjoy from increased availability of credit
and competition. 68 Second, when states design and implement
domestic policies, they are free to choose their national financial
sovereignty interest, irrespective of its impact on global economic
growth.269 A state's desire to protect its financial sovereignty is
intuitive. The third objective is the protection of financial stability,
particularly the reduction of systemic risk.270
Maintaining the status quo only achieves two objectives: financial
integration and national sovereignty. 271 However, as discussed in this
article, this choice sacrifices global financial stability, as states are
exposed to increased risk from their partners' financial systems.2 1
2 If
global financial stability becomes a mandatory priority in future
global financial systems, states must decide whether to reduce
financial integration or national sovereignty.
This choice should not be considered an absolute tradeoff-rather,
a broader approach to global finance. In practice, states could choose
a global financial system organized as a network where capital is
mobile, as it is now, but where nation states have less discretion in
regulating their economy. During the policymaking process, states
would be required to consider the external impact of their financial
policies. Alternatively, states could choose to reduce the level of
integration and break some of the interconnectedness that transmits
268. See FERGUSON JR. ET AL., supra note 18, at 46.
269. See Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, Efficient Breach of International
Law: Optimal Remedies, "Legalized Noncompliance," and Related Issues, 110
MICH. L. REV. 243, 250 (2011) [hereinafter Posner & Sykes, Efficient Breach]
(arguing that international law should help in mobilizing domestic political
interests favoring Pareto optimal international economic policies).
270. DEP'T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 8 (2009) (noting that regulation is performed in the national context,
and without consistent supervision and regulation, financial stress can spread
quickly across national boundaries). See generally PROGRAM ON INT'L FIN. SYS.,
SYMPOSIUM REPORT 14 (2009) (discussing issues in defining and combatting
systemic risk in the wake of the financial crisis).
271. See Dirk Schoenmaker, The Financial Crisis: Financial Trilemma in
Europe, VOX CEPR'S POLICY PORTAL (Dec. 19, 2009), http://www.voxeu.org/
article/financial-crisis-and-europe-s-financial-trilemma (discussing the trilemma
and the inability to obtain all three).
272. See discussion infra Part IV.
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systemic risk.273 This option does not require a complete return to a
Bretton Woods System without any capital mobility 74 but simply a
reduced level of network interconnectedness through less "host-
country control" and ring-fencing, less freedom in fiscal
policymaking, or increased regulatory barriers to finance.275
The trilemma is not a perfectly modeled and ready-to-use financial
theory, as it lacks solid mathematical foundations--especially when
measuring financial stability. Nevertheless, it illustrates the
underlying tensions between protecting national objectives and
maintaining financial stability in global finance. The trilemma
provides a fairly stylized picture of the broad conflicts regulators
must solve when regulating global systemic risk.
With the trilemma in mind, the next step is to consider whether it
is possible or practical to regulate the different sources of systemic
risk or prevent its transmission across borders. In doing so, we
analyze the role of international law in regulating interconnectedness
and trigger events.
B. REGULATING INTERCONNECTEDNESS
One of the key lessons from the global financial crisis is that
financial institutions have not fully assessed the risks associated with
their interconnectedness with other financial or sovereign entities.276
Participation in a financial network benefits financial firms, but they
often ignore the costs corresponding with such interconnectedness.277
Thus, they might rely excessively on short-term funding from the
repo or money markets to reduce liquidity problems, or hold too
much sovereign debt to reduce the amount of first tier capital that
273. See PROGRAM ON INT'L FIN. SYs., supra note 270, at 14 (describing
systemic risk as hard to define, but it is the amount of risk necessary to prevent
excessive risk-taking while some amount of risk to encourage an acceptable
amount of risk-taking).
274. See DANi RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX: WHY GLOBAL
MARKETS, STATES, AND DEMOCRACY CAN'T COEXIST (2012) (implying that some
influential authors recommend abolishing capital mobility).
275. See Krimminger, supra note 206, at 409.
276. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT:
SUPERVISORY FRAMEWORK FOR MEASURING AND CONTROLLING LARGE
EXPOSURES 2 (2013) [hereinafter BASEL COMM., CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT].
277. Id. (examining contagion as a cost not always taken into account).
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must be set aside under the Basel framework 7.2 1 Or, they may simply
be overexposed to one single counterparty or a group of
interconnected counterparties 7 9 In the event of a counterparty
default or a systemic shock, network interconnectedness becomes a
transmitter that spreads instability across the financial system. Given
the systemic risk implications of financial linkages, regulating
interconnectedness is a priority.28 °
1. Recent Domestic Regulatory Reforms
Regulation of financial interconnectedness is in its infancy
compared to other avenues of reform, such as capital adequacy or
supervision.28 ' At the outset of the crisis, when the risks of excessive
interconnectedness became clear, commentators proposed various
solutions. The initial regulatory focus was on taxes, 282 levies,283 or
278. See EUROPEAN BANKING AUTH., EU-WIDE TRANSPARENCY EXERCISE
2013: SUMMARY REPORT 12-14 (2013) (conveying that Basel III, like its
predecessors, assigns a zero-risk weight to OECD countries' bond in calculating
capital requirements; according to European Central Bank reports, Eurozone banks
hold an average of fourteen percent exposure in sovereign bonds, while in certain
countries the exposure towards domestic sovereign bonds account for ten percent
of the overall portfolio); discussion supra Part II.2.B.
279. See Nicolas Arregui et al., Addressing Interconnectedness: Concepts and
Prudential Tools 13 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/13/199, 2013).
280. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 23 at 1355 (discussing the problem
of not taking interconnectivity into account when making business decisions);
Schwarcz, Controlling Financial Chaos, supra note 25, at 828 (arguing for
regulation to spread the word about potential problems); Scott, Reduction of
Systemic Risk, supra note 8, at 677 (noting reasons the Volcker Rules should
reduce systemic risk); Hal S. Scott, The Next Step in Global Financial Regulation:
Global Regulation of Interconnectedness, 1 GLOBAL POL'Y 332, 332 (2010)
[hereinafter Scott, The Next Step] (arguing for caps to net exposures).
281. It is important, however, to note that the danger of excessive exposures
existed long before the crisis. Indeed, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision first issued supervisory guidance on large exposures in 1991 in the
framework of Basel I. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, MEASURING
AND CONTROLLING LARGE CREDIT EXPOSURES 1 (1991); see also BASEL COMM.
ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE BANKING
SUPERVISION 12 (2012) (remarking that Core Principle 19 of the Core Principles
for Effective Banking Supervision recommends that "national supervisor
determine that banks have adequate policies and processes to identify, measure,
evaluate, monitor, report and control or mitigate concentrations of risk on a timely
basis," and that national supervisors set "prudential limits to restrict bank
exposures to single counterparties or group of connected counterparties").
282. See Sheri M. Markose, Systemic Risk from Global Financial Derivatives:
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surcharges284 as the main mechanisms to discourage banks from
becoming too interconnected to fail. Like other similar proposals-
such as Financial Transaction Taxes or Financial Activity Taxes 285-
none of them were adopted. Regulators intervened with two other
strategies instead: reduce interconnectedness or break
interconnectedness.
The first strategy was to reduce interconnectedness by setting
mandatory exposure limits on financial intermediaries.286 The BCBS
has done this since 1991, but since the crisis, it has substantially
revised its framework. The new "Supervisory Framework for
Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures ' 2  requires
international banks to communicate to their national regulators any
exposure towards counterparties equal to or greater than ten percent
of the bank's eligible capital. 288 Moreover, the value of a firm's
exposure towards counterparties must not exceed twenty-five percent
of the Tier 1 capital base at any time.289 The value is reduced to
A Network Analysis of Contagion and Its Mitigation with Super-Spreader Tax 8
(Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/12/282, 2012) (proposing a "super-
spreader" tax based on centrality analysis to raise a fund that would mitigate
potential "socialized losses from the failure of highly connected banks").
283. See Jorge A. Chan-Lau, Regulatory Capital Charges for Too-Connected-
to-Fail Institutions: A Practical Proposal 3-5 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working
Paper No. WP/10/98, 2010) (recommending the imposition of a bank levy
proportionate to the direct exposure between financial institutions).
284. See Marco A. Espinosa-Vega & Juan Sol&, Cross-Border Financial
Surveillance: A Network Perspective 21 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
WP/10/105, 2010) (recommending the imposition of capital surcharges that tackle
exposures).
285. See Kern Alexander, International Regulatory Reform and Financial
Taxes, 13 J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 893, 893, 897-900 (2010) (examining the
effectiveness of Financial Transaction Taxes); Ross P. Buckley & Gill North, A
Financial Transactions Tax: Inefficient or Needed Systemic Reform?, 43 GEO. J.
INT'L L. 745, 746 (2012) (explaining that the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany have already imposed levies on their financial sector to recoup bailout
funds).
286. See Scott, The Next Step, supra note 280, at 332 (suggesting that regulating
global interconnectedness by imposing "position limits on net exposures (including
all lending and derivatives) of financial institutions to each other").
287. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, STANDARDS: SUPERVISORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MEASURING AND CONTROLLING LARGE ExPosuRES 1 (2014)
[hereinafter BASEL COMM., STANDARDS].
288. See id.
289. The level of exposure was subject to some debate. In its 2013 Consultative
Document, the Basel Committee proposed an exposure limit lower than the current
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fifteen percent if the counterparty is a Global Systemically Important
Bank.290
Under this framework, whenever a group of counterparties are so
interconnected with each other that the failure of one would cause
the failure of all the others, the exposure limits must be calculated
with reference to the group instead of each individual institution.9
This standard is complemented by the newly issued "Capital
Requirement for Bank Exposures to Central Counterparties, 2 92
which sets various rules regarding the bilateral exposures between a
bank and central counterparties or their members.
Limiting large exposures reduces the loss a bank could potentially
face in the event of a sudden failure of a counterparty.293 The limits
also prevent the creation of a financial system in which firms are
dangerously exposed to only a few core nodes.294 One of the
drawbacks of this strategy, however, is that it cannot tackle common
shocks. In the event of a market-wide crisis, a sudden reduction in
prices across different segments would necessarily imply a
proportional reduction in the value of the balance sheet.295
The second strategy is to break the interconnectedness between
two institutions by creating an intermediary that clears their bilateral
exposures and absorbs potential shocks in the event of a counterparty
25% of Tier 1 capital base, although it didn't specify the actual level. However, the
limit remained at 25% in the final document. According to the 2013 Consultative
Document, actual practices range from 10% to 50%, with the majority of
jurisdictions applying a 25% limit. See BASEL COMM., CONSULTATVE DOCUMENT,
supra note 276, at 7.
290. See id. at 27.
291. See BASEL COMM., STANDARDS, supra note 287, at 4 (explaining that if
banks A, B, and C are considered connected counterparties, the exposure limit that
Bank H must not exceed towards them will not be 75% of the bank capital (25%
for each), but only 25% in total).
292. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR BANK EXPOSURES TO CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 16 (2012) [hereinafter
BASEL COMM., REQUIREMENTS] (discussing clearing member exposure to CCPs).
293. See BASEL COMM., STANDARDS, supra note 287, at 4.
294. See Press Release, Bank for Int'l Settlements, Final Standard for
Measuring and Controlling Large Exposures Published by the Basel Committee,
Bank for International Settlements (Apr. 15, 2014), available at
http://www.bis.org/press/pl40415.htm (making a system where the maximum
possible loss for a bank is small enough that it would not endanger other banks).
295. See BASEL COMM., REQUIREMENTS, supra note 287, at 3.
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default.2 96 This approach has been used recently in the context of
securities and derivatives trading with the creation of Central
Counterparty Clearinghouses ("CCPs").2 97 In derivatives trading,
counterparty defaults are particularly troublesome because it is
difficult for each firm to monitor and value their counterparty's
exposure toward other market participants. Until the financial crisis,
most derivatives were traded bilaterally over the counter without any
institutional trading platform. 98 In the absence of a centralized
clearing entity, a firm could not control the risk it was taking when
entering into a bilateral transaction. Consequently, in the event of a
counterparty's default, the firm was immediately exposed to the
contagion effect that would eventually reverberate across the whole
system.
Not surprisingly, the creation of CCPs was among the first
measures adopted globally to address systemic risk. 99 CCPs operate
by stepping between two members and assuming the legal role of a
counterparty for each of them in their bilateral transaction, thereby
assuring that in the event of one's default, the other would not be
impacted. 00 The philosophy of a CCP is not to limit an individual
firm's exposure toward other counterparties, but rather to concentrate
the risk in one institution only and thus break the domino effect in
the event of contagion.30
296. See id.
297. Allen, supra note 35, at 1086 (explaining the benefits of CCPs); see also
Judge, supra note 35, at 683 (summarizing the reason behind the popularity of
synthetic collaterized debt obligations); Scott, Reduction of Systemic Risk, supra
note 8, at 687.
298. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 211, 235-36 (2009) (stating that the interconnectedness in
complex modern financial markets aggravates failures).
299. See LEADERS' STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT 23 (2009)
(recounting that the G-20 requested the creation of the CCPs at Pittsburgh in
2009); Edward F. Greene & Joshua L. Boehm, The Limits of "Name-and-Shame"
in International Financial Regulations, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1083, 1129 (2012)
(noting that immediately afterwards, the United States and European Union started
to work on creating CCPs and trade repositories).
300. The non-defaulting counterparty receives the payment directly from the
CCP to minimize its risk, the CCP requires collateral deposit or margins by its
members.
301. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the domino model).
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Regulators were initially skeptical of CCPs. Some commentators
pointed out that by concentrating counterparty risk in one single
institution, CCPs would create a monstrous systemic risk problem in
the event of that institution's insolvency.30 2 Indeed, rather than
containing the negative spillovers of a counterparty's default, CCPs
would themselves become too big to fail and would necessitate
government intervention to contain systemic risk.30 3 However, by
concentrating the systemic risk of a counterparty's default in the
CCP alone, regulators would be able to focus their intervention on
only one institution that could be firewalled and more easily isolated,
rather than having to intervene with multiple defaulting institutions.
Furthermore, because the CCP acts as a central node to multiple
firms, it can monitor and evaluate the exposure and credit worthiness
of its members at all times.30 4 By doing so, it also reduces the
information asymmetry problems that are at the origin of systemic
risk. 30
5
2. Problems in Regulating International Interconnectedness
The strategies above strike a delicate balance between maximizing
the benefits of a network system and minimizing the risks that tight
interdependencies pose to financial stability. However, the global
regulatory framework for international interconnectedness presents
some clear limits.
First, the BCBS standards on large exposures do not deal with
sovereign debt exposures, which were one of the fundamental causes
of the financial crisis in Europe.3"6 Similarly, Basel III reforms leave
completely untouched the risk-weighting methodology for
302. Allen, supra note 35. The Bank of England also pointed out the systemic
risks of CCPs. However, it argued these could be reduced by proper monitoring
and surveillance. See Amandeep Rehlon & Dan Dixon, Central Counterparties:
What Are They, Why Do They Matter and How Does the Bank Supervise Them?,
53 BANK OF ENGLAND Q. BULL. 99, 147, 152-53 (2013) (discussing the framework
for supervision in the United Kingdom).
303. Alexandre Lazarow, Lessons from International Central Counterparties:
Benchmarking and Analysis 13 (Bank of Can., Discussion Paper No. 2011-4,
2011) (noting that over the last forty years, three CCPs have gone bankrupt: Paris
in 1973, Kuala Lumpur in 1983, and Hong Kong in 1987).
304. See Rehlon & Dixon, supra note 302, at 153 (raising concerns of
micromanagement as well as for the financial system as a whole).
305. See Allen, supra note 35.
306. See BASEL COMM., STANDARDS, supra note 287.
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calculating capital ratios with regard to sovereign debt.3"7
Consequently, the global financial system is still largely exposed to
the global systemic risk from sovereign default as well as from the
sovereign-bank vicious link.30 8
Second, presently there is no global framework for derivatives
transactions. Because the derivatives market is global, it would
require support by common clearing or supervisory infrastructures.
Director of the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Hal Scott,
has suggested the creation of an international body to oversee the
process of: (1) "collecting, storing and monitoring information about
positions on a timely basis; (2) setting parameters for valuing
positions and collateral (not easy in the case of disrupted markets);
and (3) devising methods for determining net exposures in light of
hedges."30 9 Similarly, the G-20 at Pittsburgh recommended that
"standardized OTC derivative contracts should be traded on
exchanges or electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and
cleared through central counterparties,... [that] OTC derivative
contracts should be reported to trade repositories... [and that] non-
centrally cleared contracts should be subject to higher capital
requirements. 310
Establishing those global infrastructures, however, requires a great
deal of regulatory coordination and deep political trust to share
confidential data-neither of which currently exists. 31 1 While the
BCBS standard on large exposures mostly harmonized national
regulatory frameworks, it did not create a centralized institution that
performs all the coordinating and supervisory functions required in a
global financial market.31 2
307. See Bank for Int'l Settlements, Low Rates Spur Credit Markets as Banks
Lose Ground, BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2013, at 1, 10 (remarking that the Basel III
reforms simply incorporated the Basel II framework on exposures to sovereigns);
see also GLEESON, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION, supra note 157 (providing an
overview of the rules under Basel II).
308. See DEMEKAS ET AL., supra note 82, at 25 (examining the vicious link
between banks and sovereigns).
309. Scott, Reduction of Systemic Risk, supra note 8, at 332-33.
310. LEADERS' STATEMENT: THE PITTSBURGH SUMMIT, supra note 299, at 9.
311. See WORLD BANK GRP., GLOBAL INFRASTRUCTURE FACILITY: UPDATE
FOR G20 3 (2014) (noting the need for partnerships with governments, nonprofits,
international organizations, and businesses to establish the necessary
infrastructure).
312. See Duncan E. Alford, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision:
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Furthermore, while the creation of proper infrastructure for
derivatives trading is progressing rapidly at the national level,313 the
same is not occurring with global CCPs and global trade
repositories. There are dangerous discrepancies between the E.U. and
the U.S. regimes in terms of what constitutes a derivative transaction,
reporting requirements, margin requirements, and the supervisory
framework.314 There is also currently only one global trade repository
for derivatives transactions.315 Creating a truly common monitoring
framework for derivatives is of fundamental importance to the
containment of global systemic risk.3 16 Given the global scope of the
derivatives market, national central banks and financial authorities
cannot rely only on domestic data to control the exposure of their
financial institutions.31 7 A strong degree of cooperation is therefore
necessary between national authorities, who need to share data on a
daily basis.318 However, as recently pointed out by Federal Reserve
An Enforceable International Financial Standard, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
237, 240-41 (2005) (discussing the Basel Committee's attempt to solve this
problem by issuing the "Core Principles" which sought to meet the regulatory
needs of the global market).
313. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 723, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (stating that Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act requires financial institutions to report date on swap and securities
transactions to trade repositories regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading or
Securities and Exchange Commission, respectively); see also Council Regulation
648/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 (describing the European Securities and Market
Authority, which is in charge of securities in the European Union, which issued a
regulatory framework for derivatives and securities trading in 2013).
314. See Greene & Boehm, supra note 299, at 1127-29 (analyzing the issues
that arise due to differing domestic policies for international markets).
315. See Global Trade Repository (GTR), DEPOSITORY TRUST & CLEARING
CORP., http://www.dtcc.com/data-and-repository-services/global-trade-repository/
(last visited Apr. 18, 2015) (observing that the Depository Trust & Clearing
Corporation Global Trade Repository is the only active global trade repository).
316. See William C. Dudley, Remarks at the Swiss National Bank-International
Monetary Fund Conference: What Does Interconnectedness Imply for
Macroeconomic and Financial Cooperation? 3 (May 8, 2012) (asserting that global
standards for financial market infrastructure are necessary for a stable system of
CCPs).
317. See TIMOTHY EDMONDS, THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON BANKING:
THE VICKERS REPORT 3 (2013) (discussing the United Kingdom's difficulties
relying solely on domestic data).
318. See Dudley, supra note 316, at 1 (conveying a strong public interest in
ensuring that global economic integration is supported by coordinated national
macroeconomic policies); see also Ulrich K6rner, Enhancing Financial Stability -
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Chair Janet Yellen, "[unfortunately] there is still no guarantee, due to
confidentiality concerns and legal barriers to data sharing, that the
data reported into these trade repositories will ultimately be
accessible to all of the regulators who require the data to obtain a
holistic view of the derivatives market.-
31 9
Finally, none of the regulatory reforms take into consideration the
systemic risk potential of "systemically important jurisdictions. 32 °
Because a few jurisdictions dominate trading in particular areas, a
concentration of exposures towards one of these jurisdictions would
make any macroeconomic problem or regulatory failure occurring
there a source of global systemic risk.
3. The Need for a Pareto-efficient Regulatory Framework
As there is no common regulatory framework for global
interconnectedness, states are left alone to cope with the dangers of
global systemic risk. Historically, states have resorted to three main
strategies to insulate themselves against external instability.32' First,
they might impose controls on the inflow of capital.322 These are
essentially regulatory barriers aimed at discouraging or impeding
foreign financial assets from entering the country.3 23 Capital inflow
controls can take many forms and be used for different purposes.3 24
A Global Bank's Perspective, in STABILITY OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, supra note
90, at 407, 416-18.
319. Yellen, supra note 34, at 20.
320. See DEMEKAS ET AL., supra note 82, at 17 (referring to a list of
jurisdictions with systemically important financial sectors).
321. See Ostry et al., Capital Inflows, supra note 219, at 5 (describing the three
main strategies: imposing controls on capital inflow, adopting ring-fencing, and
subsidiarization).
322. See id. (contending that is difficult to ascertain whether capital controls
work in practice); see also Nicolas E. Magud et al., Capital Inflows, Exchange
Rate Flexibility, and Credit Blooms 3 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No.
WP/12/41, 2012) (contending that during periods of extensive capital inflow,
domestic credit grows more rapidly); Jonathan D. Ostry et al., Managing Capital
Inflows: What Tools to Use? 6 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Staff Discussion Paper No.
SDN/l 1/06, 2011) (discussing how capital inflow surges require appropriate
domestic policy responses in order to avoid economic overheating).
323. See The Case for Capital Controls, ROBERT NIELSEN (March 16, 2014),
https://robertnielsen21 .wordpress.com/2014/03/16/thecaseforcapitalcontrols/
(arguing that there has been a shift in economist perception of capital controls).
324. See Christopher J. Neely, An Introduction to Capital Controls, 81 FED.
RES. BANK ST. Louis 13, 15-17 (1999) (explaining that capital controls can take
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In the context of systemic risk reduction, states have used capital
inflow controls to prevent the creation of asset bubbles, control
inflation, maintain monetary stability, or as macroprudential policy
tools.325
The second strategy has been to adopt "ring-fencing" techniques
to prevent foreign firms from moving their capital out of the
country.3 26 Ring-fencing, or capital outflow controls, is most
commonly used in the context of cross-border banking issues.3 27 It
legally separates the cross-border bank into two completely
independent entities, each under the control of the local authority.3 28
The third strategy is "subsidiarization. ' '3 29 This involves host
authorities only allowing foreign firms to establish operations in their
the form of taxes, price or quantity controls, or prohibitions on international trade
in assets).
325. See Ostry et al., Capital Inflows, supra note 219, at 4 (analyzing various
responses to the dangers of capital inflows to developing and emerging market
countries); see also Ross P. Buckley, The Role of Capital Controls, 11 BOND L.
REV. 231, 231 (1999) (examining Chile's response to dangers of capital inflows in
the 1990s).
326. See generally EDMONDS, supra note 317, at 4 (referring to the Vickers
Commission's responses on the use of the "fence").
327. See id. (looking at ring-fencing in the context of cross-border financial
crises); Alison Lui, Retail Ring-Fencing of Banks and Its Implications, 13 J.
BANKING REG. 336 (2012); Eugenio Cerutti et al., Bankers Without Borders?
Implications of Ring-Fencing for European Cross-Border Banks 6 (Int'l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/10/247, 2010) [hereinafter Cerutti et al., Bankers
Without Borders] (discussing three different types of ring fencing: partial ring-
fencing where only the excess profits of subsidiaries, but not their excess capital
buffers can be re-allocated within a group; near-complete ring-fencing where only
transfers from the parent to a subsidiary are allowed; and full ring-fencing where
no intra-group transfers are allowed); see also Ross P. Buckley & Sarala M.
Fitzgerald, An Assessment of Malaysia's Response to the IMF During the Asian
Economic Crisis, 2004 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 96, 97 (claiming that one of the
major lessons from the most recent financial crisis is that adequate domestic
prudential regulation must precede financial liberation).
328. COMM. ON BANKING REG. & SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, REPORT TO THE
GOVERNORS ON THE SUPERVISION OF BANKS' FOREIGN ESTABLISHMENTS 1-5
(1975) (describing the separation in supervision but the need for cooperation
between host and home countries).
329. See MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., BANKS AND CROSS-BORDER POLICY
CHALLENGES 13 (2012); D'Hulster, supra note 197, at 24-26 ("Under the
subsidiarization scheme, international banks are required to convert their foreign
branches and business lines into autonomous, stand-alone subsidiaries subject to
the regulation and supervision of each host country.").
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jurisdiction through subsidiaries, which are subject to local rules and
supervision. 3 0 Unlike ring-fencing, this technique applies before a
crisis occurs as a precautionary strategy.3 1 By preventing cross-
border financial institutions from operating local branches, it allows
host regulators to monitor and regulate foreign banks and it prevents
intrabank capital mobility of the kind discussed previously.
All three strategies are extremely effective at insulating domestic
financial systems from global systemic risk. However, they are
extremely inefficient from a global or Pareto standpoint. 32 By
focusing on the stability of individual countries rather than global
stability, they promote a Nash-efficient equilibrium in which national
gains equate to the losses of another state or investor.3 33 Indeed, what
capital control, ring-fencing, and subsidiarization achieve is a
Balkanization of the global financial system into different national
financial systems-a situation that drastically reduces the economic
benefits of financial integration.3 34 From the perspective of a foreign
investor, capitol controls reduce free capital mobility and the
freedom of investment, which in various instances is protected under
international law by international investment or trade agreements.335
330. See id. at 37.
331. Id. at 3.
332. See ALISTAIR MILNE, THE CONTROL AND MANAGEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 11 (2014)
(detailing the difficulties that can arise, including the potential for trade wars
between countries); Benjamin Hermalin et al., Risk to Lenders and Borrowers in
International Capital Markets, in INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 360, 364
(Martin Feldstein ed., 1999) (describing a framework for understanding the risk to
borrowers and lenders in international capital flows); Scott, Reduction of Systemic
Risk, supra note 8, at 679 (discussing the role of capital requirements as the chief
measure to reduce risk).
333. See CHWIEROTH, supra note 123, at 62 (discussing early views on the
relationship between capital flows and interest rate differentials).
334. But see Avinash Persaud, The Locus of Financial Regulation: Home
Versus Host, 86 INT'L AFF. 637, 646 (2010) (discussing the benefits of more liberal
capitol flows); Pistor, supra note 220, at 16 (arguing for more host country
control).
335. See Persaud, supra note 334, at 640 (examining the issues in the home
versus host country regulation debate).
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C. THE LIMITED ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN REGULATING
DOMESTIC POLICIES
The second possible strategy to contain global instability is to
address the underlying mechanisms at the origin of global systemic
risk-the trigger events that spread contagion across the system.336
Because global systemic risk is the result of domestic policies,
reducing instability necessitates reducing domestic policy space.1
3 7
This can only be achieved if states voluntarily cooperate to address
the internal political economic factors that drive their behaviors.338
However, this will not always be possible or advisable.339 This
section examines the potential for coordination on domestic policies.
1. Government Failures
Of the two issues examined in Part IV, government failures are
potentially the easiest to address through international cooperation.
BCBS regulation and other international financial standard setters
can be seen as attempts to prevent such failures. The very first
instruments issued by the BCBS on supervisory coordination
attempted to create a minimum standard of supervision that would
reduce dangerous policy discrepancies between national authorities
in the supervision of cross-border banks.34° The Basel Accords were
also intended to level the playing field for capital regulation and
therefore reduce the systemic risk implications of a bank collapse.
34 1
336. See Moser, supra note 49, at 158 (conveying the danger of failing to apply
appropriate policy measures against contagion mechanisms).
337. See id. at 177 (describing, as an example, Russia's financial crisis in
1998).
338. See id. at 168 (discussing the behavior exhibited during Argentina's
financial crisis which led to a contraction in Uruguay).
339. See, e.g., Persaud, supra note 334, at 644 (analyzing the difficulties that
can arise with international coordination of regulation, particularly when only a
few nations adopt data standards that are widely applicable and other nations using
self-beneficial methods).
340. See COMM. ON BANKING REG. & SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, supra note
328, at 1 (recounting the Basel Concordat of 1975 and its subsequent
amendments).
341. See Sandra Rutova & Tim Volkheimer, Revisiting the Basel Accords:
Lessons Learned from the Credit Crisis, 19 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 83, 85 (2011)
(recounting that the primary aim of Basel I was to stabilize the international
banking system by removing competitive advantages); Ethan B. Kapstein,
Resolving the Regulator's Dilemma: International Coordination of Banking
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When it comes to sovereign debt, the time consistency problem
can be addressed by various means. Domestic legislation can place
limits on the amount of external indebtedness.3 42 Because ruling
governments often over-borrow, imposing such limits through a
constitution or a special statute is advisable. 43 For example, E.U.'s
Stability and Growth Pact 344 and its subsequent amendments under
the Euro Plus Pact 345 in 2011 set a three percent limit in the
government budget deficit-GDP ratio of each E.U. member, beyond
which the members are subject to discipline.346 Another potential
mechanism is to transfer external borrowing policy decision-making
to an independent authority in order to protect borrowing decisions
from political interference.347
Regulation, 43 INT'L ORG. 323, 339 (1989) (setting forth the Basel Accord's four
notable effects upon financial regulations of the time period: "a common definition
of capital .... adoption of a risk-asset system[,] the inclusion of all off-balance-
sheet commitments, ... and the calculation of specific capital/asset ratios").
342. See generally DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, DEBT LIMIT: MYTH V. FACT
(2011) (describing the U.S. Department of the Treasury as a domestic institution
capable of placing limits on the amount of external indebtedness); Client Alert:
New Bank Indonesia Regulation Imposes Significant Limitations on Foreign
Borrowings by Indonesian Companies, LATHAM & WATKINS 1 (Nov. 11, 2014),
available at http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/LW-new-bank-indonesia-
regulations-imposes-limitations-on-foreign-borrowings (observing the Indonesian
efforts to place limits on the amount of external indebtedness).
343. See EICHENGREEN ET AL., PUBLIC DEBTS, supra note 238, at 21 (describing
different constitutional limits which capable of addressing government over-
borrowing).
344. See Waltraud Schelkle, EU Fiscal Governance: Hard Law in the Shadow
of Soft Law?, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 705, 706 (2007) (referring to critics that argue
that the revisions to the Growth Pact in March 2005 weakened its fiscal
surveillance); see also Jean-Victor Louis, The Review of the Stability and Growth
Pact, 43 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 85, 100 (2006) (discussing the purpose and
history of the European Union's Growth and Stability Pact).
345. See Augustin Fuerea, The European Mechanism for Financial Stability
and the Euro-Plus Pact, 19 LEx ET SCIENTIA INT'L J. 32, 34 (2012) (discussing the
measure as an effort by European leaders to overcome the 2008 financial crisis).
346. See id. at 38. However, the E.U. legislation does not tackle external
indebtedness as such. See Jacques Delors, JCMS 50th Anniversary Lecture
Economic Governance in the European Union: Past, Present and Future, 51 J.
COMMON MARKET STUD. 169 (2013); Fabian Amtenbrink & Jakob de Haan,
Economic Governance in the European Union: Fiscal Policy Discipline Versus
Flexibility, 40 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 1075 (2003).
347. See Luis Jdcome & Tommaso Mancini-Griffoli, A Broader Mandate, 51
FIN. & DEV. 47, 47-48 (2014) (looking at the importance of separating financial
decisions from self-interested political intervention and the success that central
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The real question when it comes to the global financial system,
however, is how to promote Pareto-efficient coordination. The
answer lies in the political economy dynamics of government
policies.34 Starting from Putnam's two-level game,349 political
science, legal, and economic literature has analyzed the mechanisms
that lead to adherence and compliance with international norms. The
same analyses could be applied to government failures in the
international context. From a political economy viewpoint,
government failures arise from the imbalance of power between
lobby groups, some of which oppose long-term reforms that they
consider detrimental to their interests.350 The stronger group in
capital adequacy regulation is primarily made of banks, which want
to retain their competitiveness, while the stronger group in sovereign
debt matters are current government officials who want to please
their electorate. 5
In a closed economy in which external influences are absent,
regulators are subject to regulatory capture from these groups and are
unable to promote reforms that will guarantee the long-term interests
of their country. 52 Domestic interest groups that support structural
bank independence has had in preserving low inflation).
348. Lawrence G. Sager, Pareto Superiority, Consent, and Justice, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 913, 914 (1980) (explaining that a Pareto efficient outcome exists when at
least one government is better off and no government is worse off).
349. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-
Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 433-34 (1988) (summarizing the "two-level
game" as involving a national and international level, both of which are designed
to satisfy domestic pressures, an important concept in the current political structure
of sovereign states).
350. See Jan Fidrmuc & Abdul G. Noury, Interest Groups, Stakeholders, and
the Distribution of Benefits and Costs of Reform 5 (Aug. 2003) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with G.D.N. Global Research Project) (describing the two
motivations inherent to organized interest groups).
351. See Ricardo Correa & Horacio Sapriza, Sovereign Debt Crises 6 (Bd. of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve, International Finance Discussion Paper No. 1104,
2014), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2014/1104/ifdpl
104.pdf (discussing the recent European crisis as important determinants of
sovereign debt events); Capital Guidelines and Adequacy, FED. RESERVE BANK,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/topics/capital.htm (last
updated Apr. 8, 2015) ("Capital regulation is particularly important because
deposit insurance and other elements of the federal safety net provide banks with
an incentive to increase their leverage beyond what the market-in the absence of
depositor protection-would permit.").
352. See Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review,
2015]
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regulatory reforms-such as younger generations or depositors and
taxpayers-are less visible or more dispersed and therefore less well-
represented in the process of regulatory design.353 In an open
economy, however, domestic groups favoring long-term and
globally-efficient reforms are supported by foreign interest groups-
mainly states and investors or even international organizations-that
similarly have an interest in their partner countries having a stable
economy.354 Foreign interest groups, however, cannot exert their
influence in the domestic political process.355 In this situation,
international law plays an important role in pairing domestic and
foreign interest groups to create a more powerful lobby group
favoring globally Pareto-efficient reform.356
The power of global coalitions is already very visible, especially
when it comes to financial standards. To offset local interests
opposing prudential standards, foreign interest groups act through
two main channels.357 First, financial markets exert pressure on local
governments through reduced ratings or by threatening to move their
capital elsewhere.358 Second, international financial organizations
Capture, andAgency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1340 (2013) (linking the threat
of capture with the perceived need to increase presidential authority).
353. See, e.g., Christopher Matthews, Are Banks Bluffing About the Danger of
Banking Regulation?, TIME (Mar. 14, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/03/
14/bookwallstreetsbiggestandmostdangerousuntruth/print/ (noting that Wall Street
has effectively convinced politicians in Washington, D.C. to not raise equity
requirements from the seven percent agreed to by 2019 in Basel III to twenty
percent to thirty percent).
354. See DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES 1 (2013) (noting that the United States has been successful in attracting
foreign investors because of its stable economy).
355. See D'Hulster, supra note 197, at 15-16 (discussing the difficulties that
non-host country nations and organizations can have trying to affect policies
within the host country due to a lack of incentive for the host country to respond).
356. See Posner & Sykes, Efficient Breach, supra note 269, at 247 (referring to
the positive role of international law in mobilizing domestic interest); Joel P.
Trachtman, International Law and Domestic Political Coalitions: The Grand
Theory of Compliance with International Law, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 127, 134 (2010)
(explaining how political coalitions are formed in the international arena with the
support of international law).
357. Arthur MacEwan, The IMF and Argentina's Spiraling Crisis, FOREIGN
POLICY IN Focus (Sept. 1, 2001), http://fpif.org/the-imf and-argentinas
spiraling-crisis/.
358. See William A. Niskanen, Capital Mobility, Inflation, and Harmonization,
17 CATO J. 323, 324 (1998) (contending that the increased mobility of capital
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exert institutional pressure through some of the various mechanisms
of supervision359 or through lending conditionality.3
60
A similar result could also be achieved with sovereign debt.
International agreements on sovereign debt36' could contain
provisions that mandate a certain domestic regulatory framework,
such as the ones we have described. Before allowing investors to buy
sovereign bonds from a foreign country, the investors' parent
authorities could ensure the host country had such a framework.362
The IMF could also require the adoption of such legislative reforms
under its conditionality package.3 63 Finally, rating agencies could
factor in those mechanisms when evaluating sovereign credit
limits the ability of governments to impose costs on the owners of capital); id.
(describing, as an example, the United States' influence over the IMF's monetary
policies, specifically, its negative impact on Argentina).
359. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL LAW: THE GLOBAL
CRIsIS 5 (Mario Giovanoli & Diego Devos eds., 2010) (observing that the IMF-
World Bank Financial Sector Assessment Programme is the most prominent
example of this practice).
360. See Chris Brummer, How International Financial Law Works (And How It
Doesn't), 99 GEO L.J. 257, 310 (2011) [hereinafter Brummer, International
Financial Law] (describing the conditional requirements imposed by IMF and
World Bank loans); see also BRUMMER, SOFT LAW, supra note 15, at 67-69
(discussing monitoring as a condition to lending); Chris Brummer, Why Soft Law
Dominates International Finance-And Not Trade, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 623, 640
(2010) (discussing institutional sanctions such as not lending again if a borrower
fails to pay back the initial loan or making extensions contingent on complying
with set standards).
361. For example, most International Investment Agreements covering portfolio
investment.
362. At the outset, it is important to remember that host countries are already
subject to a rather stringent regulatory framework through the adoption of bilateral
investment treaties. However, these instruments are, in our view, unsuited to
regulate financial matters. First of all, they apply a regulatory framework that has
been designed to protect the interests of FDI investors rather than those of portfolio
investors. Indeed, the regulatory platform for international investment grew out of
the customary international law on the treatment of aliens and it still relies on
vague standards of treatments and an ambiguous jurisprudence that, while rightly
addressing the long-term problems of Greenfield Investment, is certainly not suited
to the complexity of international finance.
363. Irving S. Friedman, Private Bank Conditionality: Comparison with the
IMF and the World Bank, in IMF: CONDITIONALITY 109, 113 (John Williamson
ed., 1983) (describing the power of the IMF over member states through the IMF
Articles).
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worthiness by refusing AAA status to sovereign bonds from a state
that did not have in place such a mechanism of control.364
2. Asymmetries
Asymmetries in regulations and policies have been a source of
global systemic risk since the Herstatt Bank collapse. 365 However,
they are not impossible to resolve. The history of finance shows that,
under the right conditions, asymmetries can be resolved by focusing
on common incentives and, eventually, by exerting enough pressure
on non-complying states.366 The clearest example is Basel I, which
was imposed on a reluctant Japan by threatening to exclude Japanese
firms from the U.S. and European markets.367
In the context of cross-border bank resolution, various proposals
have been put in place to prevent diverging incentives from derailing
an optimal intervention on the failing bank.368 The most drastic was
to centralize banking supervision and resolution among Eurozone
countries by giving power to one centralized authority to address all
aspects of crisis resolution in the event of an emergency. The logic
was to transfer the jurisdiction of the cross-border bank to one
authority that would oversee the whole market, thereby bypassing the
principal-agent problem that affects national supervisors.3 69 The
364. Angela Monaghan, The AAA-Rated Club: Which Countries Still Make the
Grade?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/business/
economics-blog/2014/oct/1 5/the-aaa-rated-club-which-countries-still-make-the-
grade (stating that a downgrade from AAA is a "wake-up call" and is
"humiliating").
365. See Rolf H. Weber, Mapping and Structuring International Financial
Regulation: A Theoretical Approach, 20 EUR. Bus. L. REV. 651, 651 (2009);
discussion, supra Part III.B.3 (detailing the events of the Herstatt Bank collapse).
366. Cf Brummer, International Financial Law, supra note 360, at 310
(suggesting that the practices of the IMF and World Bank are ineffective at forcing
compliance from non-member states).
367. See SINGER, supra note 185, at 60 (recounting the conflict between Japan
and the capital standards based on the Anglo-American formula); see also Verdier,
Transnational Regulatory Networks, supra note 89 (examining coordination
failures).
368. See IMF, RESOLUTION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKS, supra note 206, at 19
(listing several proposals to harmonize coordination standards).
369. See SCHOENMAKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 141, at 144
(observing that centralization was first proposed by Dirk Schoenmaker as the




centralization of supervisory and crisis resolution policies into one
authority was seen as the only way to correct the regulatory and
economic problems affecting the European monetary union and is
currently ongoing among Eurozone countries.370 The European
Central Bank supervises most Eurozone banks, while the Single
Resolution Board-a specialized agency under the European
Commission-manages their resolution.37
Centralization is not, however, a feasible option outside E.U.
Because centralization deprives states of a large portion of their
sovereignty, it probably would meet strong opposition.372 In
September 2014, the FSB issued a new set of proposals to coordinate
resolution actions of national authorities during a cross-border
banking crisis that do not require the transfer of supervisory and
resolution power to a supranational authority.373 The FSB proposals
largely draw on a new approach to banking resolution, which
envisages private sector recapitalization of failing banks, the so-
called "bail-in," rather than public sector interventions.37 4 The
370. See SCHOENMAKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING, supra note 141, at 144.
371. At the time of writing, the architecture of the Banking Union is still a work
in progress. At present, the Banking Union is organized under two main pillars.
The first pillar is the Single Supervisory Mechanism ("SSM")--entered into force
in November 2014-which deals with the supervision of banks. According to the
SSM Regulation, the European Central Bank has the function of supervising all the
Eurozone banks with assets of more than €30 billion or constituting at least twenty
percent of their home country's GDP. The second pillar is the Single Resolution
Mechanism ("SRM")-entered into force on January 1, 2015-which deals with
the resolution of banks. The SRM is governed by a newly created European body,
the Single Resolution Board, which is made of representatives of the European
Commission, the European Council, the ECB, national resolution authorities, and
by permanent members. In carrying out its tasks, the SRM will apply the E.U. rules
on crisis resolution as set out by the forthcoming Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive (entering into force on January 1, 2016). For an overview of the
regulatory developments, see Memorandum from the European Commission, A
Comprehensive EU Response to the Financial Crisis: Substantial Progress
Towards a Strong Financial Framework for Europe and a Banking Union for the
Eurozone, Memo/14/244, 7 (Mar. 28, 2014).
372. See Lupo-Pasini, Economic Stability, supra note 165, at 235.
373. FIN. STABILITY BD., CROSS-BORDER RECOGNITION OF RESOLUTION
ACTION: CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT 1 (2014) [hereinafter FSB, CROSS-BORDER
RECOGNITION].
374. See id.; see also Simon Gleeson, Legal Aspects of Bank Bail-Ins 1 (London
Sch. Econ., Fin. Mkts. Grp., Special Paper No. 205, 2012) [hereinafter Gleeson,
Bank Bail-Ins] (describing the bail-ins as particularly useful for large, complex,
and international institutions or groups of businesses); Charles Goodhart & Emilios
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coordination mechanisms rely on a mix of harmonization of
resolution laws, mutual recognition of resolution actions, and private
contractual approaches.375
More specifically, under the 2011 and 2014 FSB Key Attributes of
Resolution Regimes, national resolution authorities are expected to
implement national resolution laws that contain minimum key
regulatory and policy tools, thereby guaranteeing a high degree of
regulatory convergence.376 Among the key elements are the adoption
of statutory power in the hand of resolution authorities to enable the
bail-in of bank's creditors, enhanced mechanisms to share
information, and the statutory recognition of foreign authorities'
resolution actions. In the event of a cross-border banking crisis, the
competent resolution authority (say, the home authority) will have
the right to initiate the resolution procedure and implement it across
the entire banking group, including the foreign affiliates. The home
authority will be able to request the host authority recognize the
action taken by the home authority and to request direct support
implementing the resolution of the foreign branches and subsidiaries
in the host jurisdiction.3" To enhance further cooperation and reduce
regulatory arbitrage, cross-border banks will be required to accept
the power of resolution authorities with regard to debt restructuring
by inserting in the debt contract provision that waive standard
creditors' rights.378
Avgouleas, A Critical Evaluation of Bail-Ins as Bank Recapitalisation Mechanisms
I (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 10065, 2014); Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bank Resolution in the European Banking Union: A
Transatlantic Perspective on What it Would Take 4 (Univ. of Oxford, Legal
Research Paper No. 18/2014, 2014) (arguing for a wider adoption of bail-in's
based on U.S. experience).
375. See FSB, CROSS-BORDER RECOGNITION, supra note 373, at 13 (proposing
the adoption of contractual recognition of bail-in); see also Gleeson, Bank Bail-Ins,
supra note 374, at 15 (examining the classic bank resolution mechanism).
376. See FIN. STABILITY BD., KEY ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION
REGIMES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 1 (2014).
377. See Guillermo Ortiz, Cross-Border Banking and the Challenges Faced by
Host Country Authorities, in CROSS-BORDER BANKING: REGULATORY
CHALLENGES, supra note 193, at 11, 14 (discussing the differences in regulation
between home and host countries).
378. See Creighton R. Meland, Jr., Considerations in Cross-Border Debt
Restructuring, 1 PRATT'S J. BANKR. L. 179, 183 (2005) (describing the negotiation





When it comes to realigning macroeconomic differences and
reducing cross-border spillovers, the potential for coordination is
extremely limited. The history of monetary cooperation post-Bretton
Woods shows various failed attempts to coordinate macroeconomic
policies.379 Following China's alleged manipulation of the exchange
rate, some countries-especially the United States-promoted the
establishment of a common policy framework to tackle exchange
rate misalignments.380 Not surprisingly, this did not occur. As Keynes
warned, in an interconnected global economy, the mobility of capital
makes it extremely difficult to find a Pareto-efficient equilibrium in
which national policies maximize both domestic and global
efficiency. 38' Confronted with a choice between the two, regulators
will clearly favor the former to the detriment of global stability. 382
From a purely economic viewpoint, macroeconomic policy serves
to achieve multiple economic goals. Because each macroeconomic
policy tool affects multiple economic variables, cooperation cannot
be tailored to achieve only one objective.383 To be effective, political
bargains must extend to the whole set of economic objectives that the
specific macroeconomic tool addresses. 384
379. See Laurence H. Meyer et al., International Coordination of
Macroeconomics Policies: Still Alive in the New Millennium? 1 (Bd. of Governors
of the Fed. Reserve Bank, Discussion Paper No. 723, 2002) (summarizing the
proliferation of attempts to coordinate macroeconomic policies among European
nations).
380. See Bradley Schield, Comment, China's Exchange Rate Manipulation:
What Should the United States Do?, 34 Hous. J. INT'L L. 415, 448 (2012) (stating
the lack of a central voice is a weakness of U.S. policy).
381. See CHWIEROTH, supra note 123, at 63 (relaying early neoclassical
economists views on interest rates as the essential determinants of capital flows).
382. See id. at 65.
383. See Eric A. Posner & Alan 0. Sykes, International Law and the Limits of
Macroeconomic Cooperation, 86 S. CAL. L. REv. 1025 (2013) [hereinafter Posner
& Sykes, International Law] (arguing that the theoretical benefits of
macroeconomic cooperation are real but difficult to sustain).
384. See also CALOMIRIS & HABER, supra note 98, (observing that banks are an
institutional embodiment of the political system).
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Achieving this kind of coordination is, however, extremely
difficult.385 With only the possible exception of economic unions,
economic structures always differ between countries due to a variety
of factors, such as population, resources, capital, and even culture.386
To promote economic efficiency, macroeconomic policy must be
tailored to the specific needs of each country.387 Indeed, the role of
monetary authorities is to promote domestic stability and efficiency
and they must do so without taking the external impact of their
policies into account. If monetary policy were to be coordinated
between different countries, each national authority would find it
impossible to address the underlying economic imbalances that affect
their local economy.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article analyzes how domestic policies contribute to creating
global systemic risk. At the core of this problem lies a disconnect
between the global scope of financial markets and the national scope
of regulatory intervention. In a global financial system in which
nation states still control most financial and macroeconomic policies,
divergent policy preferences and government failures add additional
dimensions to global financial instability that go beyond pure market
inefficiencies. The role of international law in addressing global
systemic risk is, therefore, more complex and challenging than in
national financial systems.
In a closed economy, regulation can easily target and influence the
behavior of private institutions and address market failures.388 In a
global economy, however, in which states are separated by economic
asymmetries and diverging policy preferences, regulatory
385. See Posner & Sykes, International Law, supra note 383, at 1075
(concluding that the macroeconomic policies are often uncertain and time-variant).
386. Raj Aggarwal & NyoNyo Aung Kyaw, Transparency and Capital
Structure in Europe: Evidence of Firm, Industry, and National Institutional
Influences, in CORPORATE AND INSTITUTIONAL TRANSPARENCY FOR ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN EUROPE 335-36 (Lars Oxelheim ed., 2006) (noting that each country
has its own mores which causes the most effective policies to differ from other
countries).
387. VED P. GANDHI, THE IMF AND THE ENVIRONMENT 9 (1998) (explaining
that the IMF does not have the requisite expertise for such decisions and regularly
seeks the advice of other institutions).
388. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 185, at 1866.
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coordination is more difficult to achieve and sometimes even
undesirable. First of all, the tradeoff at the core of the international
regulatory process is not simply one between competing private
interests; it also entails a difficult compromise between competing
sovereign rights. Second, in the absence of a centralized regulator,
cooperation needs to rely on international regulatory regimes that
promote win-win situations and ensure a Pareto-efficient
equilibrium, rather than protecting individual Nash-efficient gains.
This article conceptualizes global systemic risk as an underlying
government failure, which transmits instability to the wider global
financial system through financial interconnectedness. To achieve
global financial stability, international law must operate on either one
of two elements. The first option is to correct government failures by
reducing the domestic policy space on financial policies.389
International law can play a powerful role in this regard by
mobilizing domestic political interests favoring regulatory
convergence. However, when it comes to global macroeconomic
spillovers, cooperation is extremely difficult and also unadvisable.
The other possibility is to reduce the financial interconnectedness
through which financial instability propagates. The role of the law in
this situation is to frame a correct tradeoff between the benefits of an
extended network and the need to protect against external threats. As
the legal framework to reduce the risks of global interconnectedness
remains largely underdeveloped, states are left on their own. To
protect against external threats, they resort to capital controls, ring-
fencing, and subsidiarization.3 90 These techniques, while extremely
effective in insulating the country employing them, are extremely
inefficient from a global or Pareto standpoint. Indeed, by focusing
only on individual countries' stability, they promote a Nash-efficient
equilibrium in which national gains equate to the losses of another
state or investor. Furthermore, they lead to a Balkanization of the
global financial system in which the economic benefits of financial
integration are sacrificed.
389. IMF, RESOLUTION OF CROSS-BORDER BANKS, supra note 206, at 9.
390. See discussion, supra Part V.B.3. See generally Eugenio Cerutti et al.,
Bankers Without Borders, supra note 327, at 6-7; D'Hulster, supra note 197, at 24.
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